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Abstract: e thesis comprises of three essays aimed at enhancing our understanding of
the relationship of environmental policy, rms’ innovation and eciency. In the rst essay,
we examine the direction of innovation in the U.S. metal industry with data envelopment
analysis and how is it aected by the change in the price of fossil fuels. We provide evidence
that there was a environmentally-biased innovation and it was driven by the expectations
of energy prices. In the second essay, we examine the eect of environmental policy on
eciency state-level manufacturing in the U.S. We use instrumental variables to control
for simultaneous causality and nd that stringent policy enhanced the eciency of the
manufacturing sectors. In the third essay, we examine the Climate Change Levy on rms
operating in four manufacturing sectors in the U.K. Our results show that Climate Change
Levy increased eciency.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Environmental problems - especially the threat of climate change - loom large over the
head of the world leaders. According to the most recent IPCC (2014) report, the impacts of
climate change “are projected to slowdown economic growth, make poverty reduction more
dicult, further erode food security” (p. 20). ese are beside the costs of biodiversity loss
and increased likelihood of extreme weather events (p. 13). On the other hand, governments
are also keen to reignite economic growth, which has been modest in the decade since the
Financial Crisis and the Great Recession of 2008. Most OECD countries still face higher
unemployment and lower GDP than before the crisis (OECD, 2017a,b).
Competitiveness and environmental protection are oen framed in a “jobs versus the envi-
ronment” context (Morgenstern et al., 2002), which assumes that environmental regulations
will add to rms’ cost burdens, cause a productivity slowdown, and eventually lead to job
destruction. Most recently, US President Donald Trump indicated the will for renegotiating
the Paris Agreement, because “[t]he Paris accord will undermine [the U.S.] economy” and it
“puts [the U.S.] at a permanent disadvantage” (Chakraborty, 2017).
Despite these recent developments, environmental awareness continues to rise (Gallup, 2017).
Environmental issues took an increasingly prominent place in national and international
politics in the last decade. Figure 1.1 shows the percentage of American respondents who
agreed with two propositions by Gallup. e rst, blue (top), line shows the ratio of people
who agreed that environmental protection is more important than economic growth. Despite
the ups and downs from one year to the next, there’s a clear upward trend. While in 2008
only 40% of respondents thought that environmental protection should be given priority,
it has risen to almost 60% in 2018. Similarly people, who think that the seriousness of
global warming is underestimated (depicted by the green, boom line) has risen from 30%
to over 40% in the last decade. It thus seems that environmental protection is increasingly
11
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Figure 1.1: Importance of environmental issues in the U.S. (Source: Gallup, 2017)
important to voters. While environmental policies are designed to answer this need for
environmental protection, political and economic consideration oen lead to a focussing
of aention towards their impacts on productivity. is tension between environmental
policy and productivity oen sparks heated debates about both trade-os and possible, albeit
unlikely, win-win scenarios.
Productivity is driven by innovation, but innovation also has an important role to play in
addressing environmental problems. Indeed innovation is oen thought of as a general
shier of well-being. For example, a UN report states we need innovation as a way out from
the nancial crisis (ITU, 2009). Innovation is a complex phenomenon, which rarely aects
every factor of production in the same way. If it increases the marginal product of a factor
over another factor, than it’s biased innovation. For example there’s a large literature in
labour economics about the causes of the steep increase of the wages of the skilled workers
in the 1970’s and 1980’s. According to the dominant explanation there was a large innovation,
the computer, which was biased towards skilled workers; it increased their marginal product
and hence their wages (Acemoglu, 2002; Violante, 2008).
Biased innovation has clear implications for environmental and energy economics as well.
If innovation could be purposefully directed to be biased towards cleaner production, that
would be a big step towards a solution of environmental problems. Hicks (1932) famously
wrote that it’s possible to control the bias of innovation: ”a change in the relative prices of
the factors of production is itself a spur to invention, and to invention of a particular kind
12
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 directed to economizing the use of a factor which has become relatively expensive” (p.
124-125). e Hicksian induced innovation hypothesis generated a large interest from energy
and environmental economists. In particular, a lot of papers asked whether there’s an energy
biased innovation if energy prices increase?
Newell et al. (1999) investigated this question by using product level data about home
appliances. ey found that innovation is responsive to price changes. Energy price increases
induced 33-50% more energy-ecient products and changes in products that were on sale.
Responsiveness increased when product labelling became obligatory, implying that there was
also an informational problem between the consumers and producers. Popp (2002) studied a
similar question: how energy prices motivate environmental innovation, using 1970-1994 U.S.
patent data. He used patents and probability of citations (constructed from future citations)
to proxy knowledge stock. He also conrmed the induced innovation hypothesis: energy
prices signicantly increase directed innovations. ere’s also evidence of path dependence:
the current knowledge stock is a strong predictor of current patenting activity. Strong path
dependence naturally leads to the question of lock-in: when path dependence is so strong
that the market is ”locked in” an inecient equilibrium. Noailly and Smeets (2015) examine
European rms’ renewable energy innovation with patent data to investigate the possibility
of innovation redirection (to change the bias). ey estimate a zero inated Poisson model
and according their ndings three factors inuence redirection from non-green technology
to green technology: energy prices increases, market size increases and knowledge stocks.
Energy prices have the most eect, and they’re perhaps the most easily manipulable and
thus they’re of policy interest.
Instead of looking at the energy prices some papers looked at the eect of a specic environ-
mental policy on the biasedness of innovation. In general, these studies investigated either
the eect of abatament costs, or one of the large policy experiments: the 1990 amendments of
the Clean Air Act and the EU ETS. For example, Hamamoto (2006) examines how pollution
abatement costs and expenditures induced overall R&D spending in Japan manufacturing
sector between 1966 and 1976. He nds that increasing abatements costs increase R&D
expenditure: a 1% increase in abatement costs increased R&D spending by 0.2%. Calel and
Dechezlepreˆtre (2014) use a installation-level data to investigate the eect of the EU ETS on
low carbon innovation. With rm-matching they nd that rms which participated in the
EU ETS patented about 10% more low-carbon technologies, when compared to non-regulated
ones. Popp (2003) investigated the eect of regulation of the Clean Air Act amendments on
innovative activity of coal power plants. His results show that the amendments changed the
nature of the innovations. Before the amendments, most innovative activity was directed to
lower the operation costs of scrubbers. Whereas aer the amendments and the introduction
of the cap-and-trade system, innovative activity was directed towards dierent solutions.
Specically aer the amendments SO2 removal eciency increased by 1.58%.
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us it seems that biased innovation could be directed at least for environmental purposes.
But innovation is dicult to dene and quantify. ough most of the time it’s associated
with new machines or beer products, this is a relatively narrow view. Social and manage-
rial innovations also improve the allocation of resources, thus increasing productivity and
competitiveness. According to the Oxford Dictionary, ’to innovate’ is to ”make changes
in something established, especially by introducing new methods, ideas, or products”. In-
novation describes all kind of changes in the way rm produces its outputs. is includes
adoption of new technology (dened broadly) from the rm’s point of view and the diusion
of a new method from society’s point of view. In this sense innovation could be thought as a
general process which improves the productivity of rms, be it technological or otherwise.
For this and other reasons measuring innovation with patent counts could be misleading.
Pakes & Grichilles (1980) provide an early critique of patent databases and despite important
econometric advances patent counts are still considered to be unreliable; even the popular
press raised concerns (Basulto, 2015).
First, the patenting system is almost by denition ad hoc (Pakes and Griliches, 1980), which
makes international comparisons dicult. Even in a single country, rms can patent inven-
tions outside their home country, taking advantage of the dierent rules. e ad hoc nature,
also implies, that a patenting category has diculty capturing the potential uses and eects
of a patent, in other elds. It’s also dicult to control for quality: some patents have no
economic and technical value, whereas important innovations are not patented or patented
only later.
Second, even if the patenting systems were perfectly harmonised with a rm theoretical
grounding, they would still measure invention, but not innovation as a whole. Moreover the
overwhelming majority of patents cover only product and process invention (managerial,
market and organisational inventions are rarely patented).
Finally, the innovation policy literature (e.g. von Graevenitz et al., 2011; Blind et al., 2006, 2009)
emphasises that patenting is a business decision and hence entails strategic considerations
by the rm. Firms which have other means to protect their intellectual property (secrecy,
copyright etc.) won’t use the patent system. ese imply that patents are an endogenous
proxy for innovation.
Another popular measure for innovation is R&D expenditure (e.g. Jae and Palmer, 1997b).
As with patents, it’s unclear how it maps to innovation. Just as patents R&D expenditures
usually don’t cover all types of innovations: only product and process ones. e endogeneity
problem arises here as well. Reporting R&D expenditures is a strategic decision. Some
rms will report it accurately (especially if they’re under regulatory scrutiny; Brouwer
and Kleinknecht 1996); some rms won’t report it, even if they collect it (hence a missing
value doesn’t necessarily mean zero R&D expenditure); some will overrepresent it to aract
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investment (Koh and Reeb, 2015).
ese are the two most popular proxies. Some researchers use the responses from a survey
conducted among the managers of the rms. To ease response burden it’s usually a Likert
scale type question, meaning a manager typically needs to value it’s R&D activity on a scale
of 1 to 5, where 1 is the lowest (”Strongly disagree”), 5 is the highest mark (”Strongly agree”).
e answers to these types of questions are dicult to aggregate.
Another possible approach is to collect data from catalogues about product characteristics
(e.g. Newell et al., 1999). is was criticised by Gallagher et al. (2006), because it ignores
tacit nature of technical knowledge. Additionally it’s dicult to distinguish between true
innovations and imitations. Since it only measures product innovation, it’s biased towards
certain industries.
Jensen and Webster (2009) shows that the various innovations proxies are relatively weakly
correlated. is implies that innovation is captured noisily by these variables. According
to the (Jensen and Webster, 2009, p. 262): ”[…] the dierent measures of innovation vary
substantially at the rm level and, therefore, care must be taken when choosing amongst
dierent innovation proxies”, as the dierent variables can capture dierent phenomena.
When measuring innovation this thesis relies on production economics, in which innovation
is dened as a shi in the production function (or isoquants) (e.g. Salter, 1960; Nelson and
Winter, 1977). Using production economics (or more specically productivity and eciency
analysis) to measure energy/environmental innovation is a recent practice. Fleishman et al.
(2009) were the rst to use two-stage data envelopment analysis in an energy/environmental
seing. ey nd that the 1990 Clean Air Act revisions had a positive eect on energy
eciency (they omit prices from the estimation). Jaraite and Di Maria (2012) use country-
level power-plant data to examine EU ETS, and comprehensively estimate the eect of energy
prices as well. Estimates without shares show that coal has a moderate positive eect, oil and
gas stronger negative on environmental eciency. But the structure of the industry maers.
CO2 price increases environmental eciency, but it has no eect on economic productivity.
In the rst chapter of the present dissertation, I contribute to this strand of literature by
estimating and comparing both environmental and economic productivity. is enables a
beer understanding of the innovation pathways – and their bias – and to assess the impact of
changes in energy prices on the bias. Economic productivity is measured by the productivity
of inputs, whereas environmental productivity is the productivity of the pollutants. is
reliance of productivity analysis avoids the shortfalls of other proxies discussed above. Unlike
R&D expenditures or patents, they have clear relation to business conduct. ey can also
capture a wider of array of innovations; not only technological inventions, but also adoption
and changes in managerial conduct. In the rst chapter we examine the US metal industry
and nd signicant environmentally biased innovation towards the price expectations.
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An important and related question is whether this translates into dierent business conduct.
Do environmental policies help rms’ productivity or do they simply crowd out other
investments, potentially drawing resources away from productivity enhancing innovations?
Michel Porter famously conjectured that environmental policy could help rm performance
(Porter, 1991; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Figure 1.2 depicts a schematic representation
of the proposed relationship between environmental policy and rm performance. He
believed that environmental policies induce innovations which improves environmental
performance - a belief which is well-founded based on the empirical literature introduced
above.1 He thought that environmental innovations could translate to improvement of
economic performance; an innovation spurred by a well-designed environmental regulation
could oen oset the associated costs. Porter proposed ve mechanisms which could lead to
this outcome.
First, a regulation might signal about resource ineciencies. Firms are ill-informed or badly
managed and miss out on the systematically protable opportunities (“low hanging fruits”),
which could be highlighted by an environmental regulation. Second, policies about reporting
or information gathering could raise corporate awareness of environmental issues. ird, a
regulation reduces uncertainty about the protability of future environmental investments.
If rms know that energy use will be taxed for the next years, it will more likely that they will
invest in energy ecient machines or streamline the production process. Fourth, environ-
mental regulation creates pressure for innovation and progress. Fih, environmental policy
levels the ’transitional playing eld’. Firms can’t gain advantage by avoiding environmental
investment.
In other words, rms make suboptimal choices because of organizational or informational
problems, or because of the presence of other market failures. Environmental policy could
improve productivity and eciency of rms. e Porter hypothesis has political implications,
because if it’s true then the competitiveness losses envisioned would be only true for badly
designed policies.
e empirical literature is mixed on whether environmental policies could induce not only
innovations, but eciency and productivity improvement as well. Berman and Bui (2001)
examine oil reneries in the Los Angeles Area with plant level data. ey nd that local
environmental regulations increased abatement spending in these plants. e abatement
investment, in turn, increased plant-level productivity. ey conclude that the Porter hypoth-
esis seems to be true, but abatement costs are likely to overstate the true cost of regulations.
Greenstone et al. (2012) research the eect of Clean Air Act Amendments on manufacturing
1Accordingly, one may place the literature introduced above within Porter’s framework. In this context,
the proposed link between environmental policy and innovation, i.e. the le side of Figure 1.2, is also referred
to as the ’weak’ Porter hypothesis.
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Figure 1.2: Schematic representation of the Porter hypothesis (adapted from Ambec et al.,
2013).
plants’ productivity. ey proxy regulations with the aainment of plants and counties.
Interestingly they nd that strict regulations are associated with 2.6% TFP decline for all
pollutants except for CO regulations where there’s a positive eect on TFP. Broberg et al.
(2013) use Swedish wood-, pulp-, metal- and chemical rm -level data in a dynamic stochastic
frontier model. ey use pollution prevention and pollution control investment as policy
proxies and nd no evidence of the PH. Specically they nd that environmental regulations
signicantly decrease rm eciency.
e selected literature review shows that the evidence is mixed on the PH. In the second
essay, I investigate how the results of these conicting rm level studies would add up to
an aggregate picture. In particular I examine the manufacturing sectors in the U.S. states
data an stochastic ineciency model (see next section). I aspire to provide a treatment for
the endogeneity of policies, as environmental policies don’t happen in a vacuum. While
most theoretical models assume environmental policies to be exogenous (though there are
exceptions, e.g. Barre, 1994), in an empirical work we can’t assume away the social and
legal context of the policies. Industries lobby, consumers vote.
Similarly, in the third essay I investigate the empirical validity of the Porter hypothesis. But
instead of looking at the manufacturing sector as a whole, I examine four selected sectors in
United Kingdom. In recent years micro-databases are increasingly available, so I can look at
the eect of environmental policies on plant level, but still examine the dierences across
sectors. Another feature which sets this essay apart from the rst two is that it elicits the
eect of a specic policy in the UK: the Climate Change Levy. is focus narrows the general
seing of rst and second essays, but it allows a more accurate elicitation of the eects in
specic scenarios.
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1.1 Innovation in a production economics framework
As mentioned in the previous part of the Introduction, the present work considers innovation
to be a shi in the production process, regardless of the source.
e textbook models assume perfect competition, and hence no productive or allocative
ineciency of rms. e empirical literature in management research shows that this is
assumption is oen violated; there can be huge dierences between rms even in narrowly
dened industries (e.g. Chew et al., 1990). Clearly, this implies the untenability of the perfect
competition model. As reactions to this untenability two separate, independent literatures
emerged: one from industrial organisation (e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996), and one from op-
erations research (e.g. Aigner et al., 1977). e main dierences between them are the
assumptions they are willing to make. e industrial organisation productivity literature
supports its identication strategy by making strong assumptions about the nature of compe-
tition and the mechanisms underlying it (Syverson, 2011a). Productivity analysis, spanned by
the operations research literature, aspires to be more agnostic about the appropriate model
of competition or the evolution of productivity dierences. Despite the dierent approaches
the estimates tend to be relatively similar (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). To be general, I will use
the methods of productivity analysis in this dissertation. is also lowers the data demands,
hence the eect can be reliably estimated.
Productivity analysis allows for ineciencies arising from temporal bad governance or
imperfect market structures. In production economics, production is dened as converting
inputs (x ) into outputs (y).
Inputs Firm Outputs
Innovation is assumed to be an improvement of production.
e way a rm can convert inputs into outputs depends on its technology; the technically
feasible input-output combinations are described by its technology set:
T = {x can produce y} .
One may distinguish two types of movement: movement of T and movement within T .
Movement of T signals a change in possible achievable output for given quantity of input;
technological change (in the broad sense of the word). e second movement (within T )
shows the adoption or diusion of a given technology as the rm is moving closer to the
boundary of T - the production function, f (x). ere are multiple ways to interpret f (x),
depending on the approach taken it could be interpreted as a best practice of the rms
18
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x
y
y = f (x)
T (x ,y)
Figure 1.3: Technological set T and production function f (x).
(Caves et al., 1982) or a rst best, a theoretical best case scenario which won’t materialise
(Kumbhakar et al., 2013). Depending on the model it’s not always possible to distinguish
between the movements. But both are important: a new policy can induce new directions
but if rms won’t adapt these solutions the policy may not achieve its explicit goals. At the
same time policies generally aim to induce inventions, e.g. IPCC (2014, p. 26) argues that
countries need new technologies to mitigate the impacts of climate change.
Estimating the impacts of policies require to look at both outcomes. Figure 1.4a shows
eciency change in a simple one input, one output model. e rm, represented by the
black dot, improves it’s production by making more output, from less input. Note that f (x)
doesn’t change, meaning there was no change in the overall technology only in the rm’s
conduct. While Fig. 1.4b looks at the intuition of a shi of f (x), or technical change. e
production function shis out; it’s not a change in production of a single rm but the change
of the frontier achievable by all rms. is framework gives more exibility and allows us
to capture a wider array of innovations than the traditional proxies. In this dissertation I
will look at how environmental policy aects the distance in T (distance from f (x)) and the
position of T itself (or f (x)).
In general, there are two broad approaches of estimating T (or f (x)) and the corresponding
eciency of rms. First, data envelopment analysis is a completely non-parametric technique
with great exibility about the assumptions of the production process. It envelopes T and
compares rms to the boundaries. is allows index-compositions and decompositions, but
it also means that the method can’t describe the production function (f (x)). Furthermore,
being a deterministic method, the error term is assumed away.
e second method, stochastic frontier analysis is a parametric method, and instead of
focusing on T , it aspires to describe f (x) and compare the rm to that. It also allows for
mismeasurement, and indeed its primary concern is to disentangle the unobserved error term
19
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x
y
f (x)
(a) Eciency change.
x
y
f1(x)
f0(x)
(b) Technological change.
Figure 1.4: Possible eects of innovation.
from the unobserved ineciency. While the potential questions which could be answered
by these methods are similar, scholars typically use them for dierent purposes. Stochastic
frontier analysis is used to answer questions about eciency, whereas data envelopment
analysis is used for productivity estimation and decompositions.
e dissertation employs both of these methods. Figure 1.5 provides a quick illustration and
show the dierences between the methods in an intuitive way.
e rst panel of shows data envelopment analysis, where the frontier is based on the best
practices and any shortfall is interpreted as ineciency (shown by the doed line for a
rm). It’s an agnostic method, it only assumes that what has been achieved (also their linear
combinations) could’ve been achieved by other rms.
Stochastic frontier analysis, shown by the second panel is almost like a production function
estimation, but with the added ineciency. It’s worth noting that the doed line here includes
the ineciency and the error term. In this case we can easily interpret the coecients of the
inputs. Note that these graphs are highly stylized and both data envelopment and stochastic
frontier includes vastly dierent families of models and could look completely dierent than
the gures, depending on the assumptions.
1.2 Outline of the thesis
e thesis consists of three independent pieces of research and presented as such. As a result
some repetition between the chapters is inevitable. e rest of the thesis is organised as
follows. In Chapter 2, I investigate Hicks’ (1932) induced innovation hypothesis focusing on
energy consumption in the US metal sector. I use Data Envelopment Analysis to estimate
the extent of ’green’ (pollution reducing) and general (input reducing) innovation. During
20
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x
y
(a) Data envelopment analysis.
x
y
f (x)
(b) Stochastic frontier analysis.
Figure 1.5: Intuition behind the productivity analysis methods.
the sample period I nd evidence of environmentally biased innovation, driven by both
technical change and eciency change. In the second part of Chapter 2, I show that energy
price expectations could explain the ’green’ bias in the innovation and overall the induced
innovation hypothesis is true.
e Chapter 3 looks at the eect of energy policy stringency on the eciency of the US
manufacturing sector. is chapter uses stochastic frontier analysis in a relatively short
timeframe (5 years). e stringency is traced by an index number and the paper addresses
the possible reverse causality issues by instrumental variables. e Porter hypothesis is
strongly supported. Stringent policy enhances eciency and hence competitiveness.
In the fourth chapter, I use UK rm level data to elicit the eect of the Climate Change Levy
on eciency in 4 selected sectors. We control for the non-random assignment of Climate
Change Levy tax rates by using a sample selection model in the stochastic framework. While
the ineciency declines is large (more than 80%), this translates to 11-27% increase in output.
e last chapter concludes.
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Chapter 2
Energy Prices and Biased Innovation:
New Evidence from the U.S. Metal
Industry
Abstract:1 is paper empirically investigates the induced innovation hypothesis of Hicks1932
examining the eects of changes in energy prices on environment-biased innovation in the
US metal industry. Contrary to most of the existing literature, we focus on actual input
and output data rather than invention proxies such as patent counts and R&D spending.
Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we compute changes in both environmental and
economic productivities and their components (technical and eciency changes) and nd
strong evidence of environment-biased innovation. We also show that improvements in
environmental productivity are associated with changes in energy prices over time. Overall,
our results strongly support the induced innovation hypothesis.
2.1 Introduction
By providing transparent signals about the relative scarcity of goods, prices perform a
fundamental role in the economy. As refers specically to the prices of productive inputs,
Hicks (1932) pointed out early on that
“A change in the relative prices of the factors of production is itself a spur to
invention, and to invention of a particular kind – directed to economizing the use
of the factor which has become relatively expensive.” (ibid., pp 124-125)
1is chapter is based on joint work with Dr. Corrado Di Maria.
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us – the theory goes – the dynamics of input prices maer greatly for the type of technology
developed by inventors and innovators. e natural implication of this is that purposeful
modications of input prices – e.g. via taxes and subsidies – could be used to direct innovation
in the direction most favoured by the policy maker.
While these ideas hold general appeal for economists, they have encountered particular
favour among economists investigating issues linked to environmental sustainability and
climate change, due to the obvious relevance of policy-driven price changes in this context
and the opportunities oered by ‘green’ innovation (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2012). As current
perceptions on climate – and more broadly environmental – policy relies heavily on the
idea that technological change reduces the expected costs of future policy interventions,
it is especially important to empirically assess the induced innovation hypothesis in this
context.2
A large empirical literature has sought to investigate these theoretical predictions, and much
work has been devoted, for example, to the impact of changes in energy prices on innovation
(Newell et al., 1999; Popp, 2002; Aghion et al., 2016). Much of this literature, however, links the
concept of innovation to the idea of available technology and, accordingly, proxies technical
change with patenting activity. While this is in part explained by issues of data availability,
the use of patent counts as metrics for innovation is problematic. It is apparent that patents
led and granted should be more appropriately considered as an output indicator of R&D
(or invention) activity, rather than of wider innovative success, as inventions might not be
widely deployed (Gallagher et al., 2006). Additionally, international comparisons in patents
may be awed because the quality of patents varies substantially across countries, as does the
propensity to patent. Similarly, dierent industries have dierent patenting strategies adding
to the noisiness of the data.3 It is also important to keep in mind that while the availability
of the technology is a necessary condition for innovation, it is far from sucient. If the aim
is to assess the impact of changes in input prices on the technology actually employed by
rms, accounting for the deployment and the diusion of the technology is critical (Linn,
2008).
In this paper, we try to address some of these shortcomings and revisit the induced (di-
rected) innovation hypothesis using actual input and output data within a Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) framework. We see three main advantages in this strategy, that underpin
2Despite a growing literature to the contrary – e.g. Bauman et al. (2008); Perino and Requate (2012); Di
Maria and Smulders (2017) – the perception that current policy eorts induce the development of technology
that facilitate future ones is still rmly radicated as emphasized, for example, by the recent contributions of
Fried (2018) and Liu and Yamagami (2018).
3Since our eorts below are conceptually – if not methodologically – related to this strand of the innovation
literature, it is appropriate to at least mention that the main results from the literature which uses patenting
activity to proxy for innovation indicate a modest positive link between prices and ‘green’ patent counts (e.g.
Popp, 2002; Ley et al., 2016; Aghion et al., 2016).
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our contribution to the literature. On the one hand, we focus on actual rms’ behaviour
rather than on what is potentially feasible, i.e. we describe what happens as opposed to what
could happen. Formally, our focus is on the realized best practice frontier rather than on
changes in the production possibilities set. is is obviously important from the policy stand
point as what maers is whether the policy actually produces desirable change, not just the
possibility of it. On the other hand, we resort to data envelopment analysis (henceforth DEA)
for our empirical investigation. Being a non-parametric method, DEA allows us to estimate
the ecient frontiers over time and the associated changes in productivity without the need
for the behavioural assumptions that underpin alternative methodologies. As our focus is on
realized eciency improvements and actual productivity changes, we can be agnostic as to
the underlying model of competition, for example. ird, our chosen methodology further
allows us to decompose changes in productivity over time in its two components of technical
change, which shi the ecient frontier outwards, and eciency change, which measures
the degree to which individual decision making units approach or fall further away from
the ecient frontier. is decomposition provides indication as to whether we are facing
technological innovation implemented only by the industry forerunners, or whether there
is a more generalized process of diusion of new methods of production across the whole
industry.
In what follows, we use industry-level data on U.S. metal manufacturing over the period
1990-2008 to estimate changes in economic and environmental productivity over time. By
comparing and contrasting the economic and environmental measures, we are able to assess
the existence of biased technical change, i.e. technical change that increases the productivity
of certain inputs over that of the others (Acemoglu, 2002). Exploiting the features of our
chosen measure of productivity change, the Malmquist productivity index, furthermore, we
calculate indexes of technical change and eciency change, thus disentangling shis in the
frontier from movements of our observations relative to the frontier. In the second stage
of our analysis, we employ an econometric approach based on the seminal contribution of
Simar and Wilson (2007) to gauge the impact that input prices have on productivity change
and its components. Our results show a signicant bias in the evolution of the relative
productivity of productive inputs, with a sizeable increase in the productivity of polluting
ones relative to others. We also nd signicant positive correlations between increases in
energy prices and productivity gains.
While we are not the rst to adopt such a methodology, using DEA to measure energy
innovation is a relatively recent practice in the economic literature. Fleishman et al. (2009)
were – to the best of our knowledge – the rst to use a two-stage data envelopment analysis
in an energy economics seing. Analyzing a panel dataset of power plants in the U.S., they
nd that the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments had a positive eect on energy eciency.
Contrary to our contribution, however, they do not look directly at the role of energy prices
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nor do they discuss biased innovation. Within their discussion on the eectiveness of the
EU climate policy action, Voltes-Dorta et al. (2013) examine the automobile market in Spain
between 2004 and 2010 with a DEA-Malmquist approach. ey nd that higher fuel prices are
correlated with eciency improvement for gasoline cars, but seem to imply a counterintuitive
drop in the eciency of diesel cars. While methodologically related to ours, their analysis
focuses on the short-run impact of emissions limits on new vehicle purchases and thus
pertains more to consumers’ choices rather than to biased technical change. Finally, Jaraite
and Di Maria (2012) use a EU-wide dataset on fossil-fuel-based public power plant sectors
over the twelve-year period (1996-2007) that spans the ratication of the Kyoto Protocol and
the rst three years of the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). e
authors investigate the link between environmental policy stringency and environmental
eciency, with a focus on the impact of allowance prices and the level of permit allocation on
eciency rather than on biased innovation. ey conclude that system design maers very
much in the EU ETS as emissions prices exhibit a strong positive correlation with eciency
change, whereas generous allocations have an opposite eect. e carbon price is found not
to have any statistically signicant eect on productivity change, however.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows, in Section 2.2 we rst present the methodology
that we will use to estimate the productivity of the decision making units over time and to
decompose the productivity index into his two components of technical change and eciency
change (Section 2.2.1). Next – in Section 2.2.2 – we detail the empirical strategy that we
will use to identify the drivers for each of the indexes, focussing on the challenges posed by
the nature of the dependent variables calculated using DEA. e following section, Section
4.4, discusses the data and describes their sources and characteristics. Section 4.5 contains
the description of the results of our empirical eorts and discusses the economic intuition
behind them. Finally, Section 2.5 summarizes and concludes.
2.2 Measuring and explaining productivity changes
In this paper, we investigate to what extent changes in energy prices drive energy-saving
innovation. Our goals are to account for both bona de innovation and adoption of existing
technologies within a unied framework, to identify the eciency gains connected with
changes in technology, and to provide evidence as to how these changes correlate with
energy prices. Since our interest is motivated by sustainability concerns as refers to the
environmental footprint of economic activity, it is important to keep our focus at the aggre-
gate level, while ensuring sucient variability in the data for our statistical analysis to be
meaningful. To this end, we use data aggregated at the 4-digit SIC industry level, so that the
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units of our analysis are industrial sub-sectors rather than rms.4
In what follows, we resort to Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Charnes et al., 1978) to
identify the ecient frontier at each point in time and to quantify the relative distance of
‘Decision Making Units’ (DMUs) from the ecient frontier. Subsequently, we use econometric
techniques to gauge to what extent the changes we observe in the indexes correlate with
changes in the price of inputs, foremost among which is the price of energy. e use of DEA
further allows us to disentangle shis in the frontier – which are most closely related to
innovation proper – from changes in DMUs’ eciency over time, an aspect more germane
to catching-up and the adoption of established technology.
2.2.1 Data envelopment analysis and productivity measurements
DEA is a non-parametric linear programming method, which has the dual advantage of not
requiring either behavioural (e.g. prot maximisation vs. cost minimisation) or structural (e.g.
perfect competition vs. oligopoly) assumptions. It also provides a exible framework within
which eciency gains may accrue from either output expansions or input contractions. By
examining factor-specic eciency and productivity, moreover, we will be able to gauge
whether DMUs systematically improve the productivity of one factor more rapidly than
that of another, providing evidence of biased technical change. Below, we compute both a
standard measure of ‘economic’ productivity and a specialized measure of ‘environmental’
productivity, which exibly accounts for eciency gains in the use of polluting inputs. We
would conclude that innovation is biased towards polluting inputs, if the laer measure
grows consistently faster than the former.
Having identied the relevant DMUs (of which there are N , say) and their input and output
vectors, in order to assess them by DEA we need to construct the production possibility set
(PPS) within which each DMU operates. e PPS contains all the correspondences of input
and output vectors that are technically feasible, at least in principle. Once the PPS is known,
the position of each DMU within it provides information on its relative performance, for
example in terms of its (relative) eciency or protability. We can dene the PPS as:
T = {(x, q, z) |(x, z) can produce q }, (2.1)
where x denotes the K × 1 vector of inputs, z is the S × 1 vector of pollutants, and q is the
M × 1 vector of outputs.
Since we are mostly interested in the energy-use and the polluting emissions of the dierent
4Prusa (2012); Akgobek and Yakut (2014); Kong and Tongzon (2006) are examples of the DEA applied to
sector-level data.
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Figure 2.1: Radial and non-radial measures in DEA.
DMUs here, we can alternatively recast our description of the technology using an input-
orientation and dene the input-pollution set,
L(q) = {(x, z) |(x, z, q) ∈ T }, (2.2)
which emphasizes the DMUs’ decisions about their inputs over those regarding their outputs.
To gauge the eciency of each DMU relative to the technological (best-practice) frontier, we
can use the concept of (radial) ‘distance function’. An economic distance function measures
the largest possible contraction (ρ) of inputs given the current input and output vectors, i.e.
Shepard (1953):
DECO (x, q) = sup{ρ : x/ρ ∈ L(q)}. (2.3)
e radial characterisation of (2.3) implicitly assumes that input shares remain stable at
dierent levels of eciency. Figure 2.1a illustrate this for the single output, two inputs, two
pollutants seing (1×2×2). In this input-space representation, the shaded area represents
the input set, L(q), whereas the solid line is the technology frontier – an isoquant drawn for
an arbitrary level of production q = q0. It is evident that DMU A uses more inputs than are
required for the production of q = q0 – i.e. it’s not on the frontier. DECO then assesses A’s
eciency by measuring the distance from A to the frontier along the ray through the origin:
the input ratio is constant along the dashed line.
While this is likely to be a fairly realistic assumption with respect to traditional inputs into
production, especially at an aggregated scale, it is rather more implausible when measuring
environmental performance. Abatement technologies exists, for example, that allow the
removal of only one type of pollutant, either due to technical limitations or as the consequence
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of policy forcing. e example of de-sulfurization units in power-plants comes to mind, where
‘scrubbers’ abate most of the SO2 emissions from ue gases doing very lile to remove other
pollutants (e.g. CO2 or NOx ). Firms deploying such technologies would achieve eciency
improvements and change the ratios of pollutant to other inputs and dierent pollutants
simultaneously. With this in mind, one may dene an environmental distance function in a
similar way to (2.3), but allowing for the fact that the DMU may in fact contract polluting
inputs not proportionally (Fa¨re and Lovell, 1978):
DENV (z, q) = sup{ρ : ρ−1z ∈ L(q)}. (2.4)
In (2.4), ρ is an S × S diagonal matrix composed of the ρ1, ..., ρS contractions corresponding
to each of the j = 1, ..., S pollutants. As mentioned above, this characterisation allows
pollution contraction to be asymmetric. Figure 2.1b suggests that rm A just wants to get rid
of pollutants, without any consideration of the possible cross-eects. As illustrated in Figure
2.1b, in this case there will be one eciency estimates for each of the two pollutants , i.e.:
DENV =
(
DENV ,1 0
0 DENV ,2
)
. (2.5)
Having specied the PPS and the appropriate eciency measures, we can then use linear
programming techniques to envelope the boundary of the input-pollution set for all output,
using data on inputs, outputs and pollution for each of the DMUs. To make this explicit, we
may replace the input-pollution set in (2.2) with its empirical counterpart:
L(qi) =
(x, z)

Qλi ≥ qi
Xλi ≤ xi
Zλi ≤ zi
 ∀i = 1, ...,N . (2.6)
In the expression above, Q is the M × N matrix of output data for all DMU and, similarly X
is the K × N matrix of input data and Z is the S × N matrix of pollutant data. e vector of
outputs for each DMU is qi , while xi and zi are the input and pollutant vectors of DMU i ,
respectively. e vector λi is a N × 1 DMU-specic vector of parameters that envelope the
boundary of the input set. Assumptions about λi represent assumptions about the returns to
scale of the modelled technology. If one only assumes that the elements of λi are greater than
0, the frontier enveloped will exhibit constant returns to scale. If one assumes that the sum
of its elements add up to 1, the frontier will exhibit variable returns to scale. Looking back at
Figure 2.1, we can see that the nodes on the frontier represent other DMU with dierent,
ecient input/pollution use, and that they shape the boundary of the input-pollution set.
As can be clearly seen from (2.6), pollution is treated similarly to an input. is is intuitively
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Figure 2.2: Disposability assumptions in DEA
clear as the less of the polluting input is used in production, the beer. One aspect that is
less obvious is that pollutants dier from standard inputs in that it is generally costly to
eliminate them. To reect this, in what follows we add the assumption of weak-disposability
rather than assuming as we had implicitly done so far that pollutants are strongly disposable,
that is that it would be possible to eliminate their use at no cost, all else equal (Piman, 1983;
Fa¨re et al., 1989).
Figure 2.2 illustrates how the dierent disposability assumption aect the PPS in the simplest
case of one output and one polluting input. In this output-input representation, the shaded
area once again represents the PPS, the dots indicate observed DMUs with their peculiar
input-output combinations, and the solid line is the ecient frontier. When we assume
strong disposability, having more of the input is always beer: if there’s too much input,
it’s always possible to dispose of it at no cost. Under weak disposability of the pollutants,
however, more pollution hurts production, and might even entail negative marginal product.
In order to incorporate the weak disposability assumption in DEA, it is necessary to add a
scalar δ ∈ [0, 1], to the constraints on pollutants and change the inequality to equality (Fried
et al., 2008). In this case, the input-pollution can be rewrien as:
L(q) =
(x, z)

Qλi ≥ qi
Xλi ≤ xi
Zλi = δzi
,δ ∈ [0, 1]
 ∀i = 1, ...,N
To estimate the distance functions in (2.3) and (2.4), one needs to dene appropriate linear
programmes. Keeping in mind that, as discussed above, the economic distance function (2.3)
assumes that the input shares are stable over time, it suces to estimate just one eciency
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parameter (θi ) for each DMU, which contracts all inputs simultaneously. Conversely, since
abatement technologies may have dierential eects on dierent pollutants, it is necessary
to estimate for each DMU and pollutant a separate eciency parameter (ϕij). Formally, the
(envelopment) program for the economic distance function may be wrien as follows:
DECO = min
θi ,λi ,δ
θi
s .t . Qλi ≥ qi ;
Xλi ≥ θixi ; (2.7)
Zλi = δθizi ;
λi ≥ 0; δ ∈ [0, 1];
i = 1, ...,N .
Correspondingly, the environmental distance function can be computed as the solution to:
DENV = min
ϕi j ,λi ,δ
S∑
j=1
ϕij
s .t . Qλi ≥ qi ;
Xλi ≥ xi ; (2.8)
Zλi = δϕizi ;
λi ≥ 0; δ ∈ [0, 1];
i = 1, ...,N ; j = 1, 2, ..., S .
In the last program, ϕi is the S × S matrix with all the possible contractions, ϕij , as diagonal
elements. e characterisation of eciency in the ENV measure is called a Russell measure
(Fa¨re and Lovell, 1978; Russell, 1985). From the simple non-negativity constraints imposed
on the λ’s, it is apparent that we are assuming constant returns to scale, due to the aggregate
nature of our DMUs. While we believe that this is the correct assumption given the sectoral
data5, an additional benet that arises from this choice is that in what follows we are going
to compute Malmquist productivity indices and Grifell-Tatje´ and Lovell (1995) have shown
that such productivity estimates might be systematically biased by assuming non-constant
returns to scale.
Obviously, individual DEA programs (just like a distance function) are only able to measure
eciency at a point in time. Using panel data, it is instead possible to measure relative
5Walheer (2018) tests the reliability of constant returns to scale with sectoral data in an econometric
estimation and nds that ”in general, this assumption is rather acceptable”. For a detailed discussion about the
feasibility of this assumption in DEA framework see Coelli and Rao (2005), who conclude that ”when dealing
with aggregate data […] the use of a CRS technology is the only sensible option” (p. 122).
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eciency over time. In so doing, however, one conates in the eciency estimates both
movements of DMU relative to the ecient frontier, which are typically linked with tech-
nology adoption, and movements of the frontier itself which are more specically related
to genuine technological advances. Since one of the goals of this paper is to discriminate,
broadly speaking, between innovation and adoption, it is important to nd ways to disentan-
gle the two processes. In what follows, we try to identify these two contributions to eciency
changes using the Malmquist productivity index (MPI), rst introduced by Malmquist (1953),
which has been widely used in the literature.6 e MPI is especially popular because it is
easy to calculate, interpret and decompose.7 e economic MPI for a given DMU over two
periods of time (1,2) is dened as:
MECO (x1, q1, x2, q2) =
[
DECO,1(x1, q1)
DECO,1(x2, q2) ×
DECO,2(x1, q1)
DECO,2(x2, q2)
]1/2
. (2.9)
One may interpret it as a change in the input-output composition, between the two periods.
Since there are two frontiers (for the two periods) and as such two measured distances for
each DMU and lile reason to favour one over another, one takes the geometric mean. is
measures relative change in productivity and is 1 if there’s no productivity change, larger
than 1 if the productivity increased, and less than 1 if there is evidence of productivity
regress.
Furthermore, one can decompose the estimated MˆECO to emphasize the contributions of
changes in eciency and technological change by rewriting (2.9) as (e.g., Fried et al., 2008,
Chap. 1):
MECO =
DECO,2(x2, q2)
DECO,1(x1, q1)︸           ︷︷           ︸
Eciency change
[
DECO,1(x2, q2)
DECO,2(x2, q2) ×
DECO,1(x1, q1)
DECO,2(x1, q1)
]1/2
︸                                          ︷︷                                          ︸
Technical change
. (2.10)
Intuitively, the eciency change component measures changes in the distance between each
DMU and the relevant ecient frontier, which accounts for the fact that the frontier itself has
shied. e technical change component, transparently, captures changes in productivity
due to the movement of the frontier itself. AsM is the product of these two terms, the
intuitive interpretation of these components is the same asM : a number lower than 1
implies regress, above 1 shows progress, while exactly 1 means that the component didn’t
over the periods.
e MPI and its components are easily calculated for economic productivity change, thanks
to the radial nature of the underlying distance measure. ey can also be computed in
a straightforward fashion for each of the individual pollutants (e.g. Zhou et al., 2010a).
6See Caves et al. (1982); Fa¨re et al. (1994) for seminal contributions in this respect.
7For other commonly used indices and indicators see Fried et al. (2008, Chap. 5).
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Unfortunately one cannot calculate the MPI for multiple pollutants, since the Russell measure
is non-radial. Given that the individual components – the ϕij – of the Russell measure are
radial, however, one can circumvent this problem by calculating pollutant-specic MPIs, call
themMj , and subsequently take their arithmetic mean to compose the environmental MPI
as follows:8
MENV =
1
S
S∑
j=1
Mj , (2.11)
which can then be decomposed in the same way as the economic index in (2.10). To the best
of the author’s knowledge, this is the rst where the productivity of multiple pollutants are
measured in a DEA framework. Zhou et al. (2010b) provided a similar measure but only to
measure carbon-productivity.
2.2.2 Explaining changes in productivity
Having introduced the methodology that allows us to compute the level of productivity and
to decompose its changes over time into technical and eciency change, we now turn our
aention to the empirical methodology that we employ below to analyze the factors that
drive such changes, within the framework of the induced innovation hypothesis. In the
second stage of our analysis, we estimate equations of the following general form:
Ym,it = β0 +γ∆ log(p)i,t+k + δXit + ui + ϵit , withm = {ENV ,ECO}. (2.12)
Equation (2.12) shows that each of the measures of productivity detailed in the previous
section – i.e. the MPIs and their components – here generically indicated by Ym, where
the indexm is used to separate the ECO from ENV measures, will be regressed on a vector
of input price changes, ∆ log(p), and additional control variables, X , accounting for the
non-observable heterogeneity across DMUs thanks to the panel structure of our data. e p
vector includes the price of energy, the interest rate and the wage rate, whereas among the
control variables we include measures of economic activity, such as value added. e terms
ui and ϵit are the DMU xed eects and the error term, respectively.
In equation (2.12), the log change in prices is indexed with a subscript t + k , to emphasize
that eciency measures are likely to react (or have reacted) to past, current and future
(expected) prices. In the innovation literature, it is common place to use either current spot
prices or weighted averages of current and past prices. Intuitively, however, innovation
would not be generally spurred by current prices, but rather by rms’ expectations of future
8Taking the arithmetic mean makes more sense than the geometric mean in this case, because it retains
the aggregate nature of the Russell measure, see (2.8).
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costs. Arguably, rms currently facing high prices but expecting them to be low in the
future will bide their time rather than investing in costly innovations. One possible way to
estimate price expectations for fossil energy would be to follow Hamilton and Wu (2013)
and Baumeister and Kilian (2014), both of whom use fossil fuel future contracts as a starting
point. Unfortunately, natural gas and coal futures are relatively new products to the market
and there’s no data available for them before 1998 (omson Reuters, 2016). We thus assume
that rms (DMUs) have rational expectations and use lead prices, instead. e use of current
and lead prices, immediately raises the issue of potential endogeneity due to simultaneous
causality as not only may future prices inuence current behaviour, but current behaviour
may in turn inuence future prices. Fortunately, EIA (2006a) and EIA (2006b) suggest that
the metal industry consumes only a marginal amount of energy compared to the total US
consumption – less than 2%. e comparable gure for electricity is less than 2.5%, those
for natural gas and coal are both around 3%. Based on this, we conclude that it is unlikely
that the current behaviour of metal sectors would signicantly inuence current and future
prices. In what follows, we estimate equation (2.12) using k = 2 as our preferred estimation,
but we also discuss the results obtained with k = −1 and 0.
In a classic reference, Simar and Wilson (2007) point our that statistical inference from
DEA estimates is not without pitfalls. ey argue that since the productivity indices are
serially correlated, standard inference approaches lose validity in this context. Intuitively,
they explain, “the correlation arises in nite samples from the fact that perturbations of
observations lying on the estimate frontier will in many, and perhaps all, cases cause changes
in eciencies estimated for other observations” (Simar and Wilson, 2007, p. 33). Depending
on the data and the empirical application, such correlation may lead to either an over- or an
underestimation of the productivity indexes and would similarly aect each of its components.
e bootstrap procedure suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007) is aimed at solving this
problem by repeatedly estimating the relation of interest over random subsamples and
computing quantile based condence intervals. If the number of iterations is suciently large,
the boostrapped condence interval can be used for inference without further corrections.
Simar and Wilson (2007, p. 33) use 2,000 repetitions in their estimations of the condence
intervals, and we adopt the same approach in what follows.
2.3 Data
To estimate the ECO and ENV eciency measures in (2.3) and (2.4), the MPIs in (2.9) and
(2.11), as well as their constituents, see (2.10), we need data about input use (X), output
production (Q) and polluting emissions (Z). As mentioned in the introduction, in this paper
we use a data-set that contains aggregate information on operations in the U.S. metal industry,
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and the associated polluting emissions spanning from 1990 to 2006 (with gaps; T = 10). Our
choice is motivated by several considerations. First and foremost, the metal industry (and
its subsectors) is a mature industry that has a relatively slow pace of product innovation in
the short-run. is is important for us in the rst instance because it makes it reasonable
to estimate frontiers enveloping the DMUs and compare them over time. An industry in
rapid transformation would not oer sucient comparability over time. Moreover, given
the nature of the industry, we would expect most innovation to be process-related, rather
than product focussed, and we have reason to believe that such innovation reacts more to
changes in energy prices than product innovation. Additionally, given our broader interest
in environmental sustainability, it is crucial that the industry we investigate be both energy
(and pollution) intensive, and economically signicant.9
Our input and output data are taken from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry database.10
e NBER-CES database contains yearly industry-level data on inputs of physical capital,
labour, energy, and material costs, as well as output indicators such as value shipped from
1958 to 2012; as such, it is ideally suited to the application of DEA methods. All values are in
current dollars, but the dataset also contains price deators to allow the computation of value
in real terms. As mentioned above, our DMUs are 4-digit Standard Industrial Classication
(SIC) sub-industries.
e pollution data come, instead, from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s National
Emissions Inventory (NEI).11 e National Emissions Inventory (NEI) is “a comprehensive
and detailed estimate of air emissions of criteria pollutants, criteria precursors, and hazardous
air pollutants from air emissions sources”, it is based primarily upon data provided by State,
Local, and Tribal air agencies for sources in their jurisdictions and supplemented by data
developed by the US EPA. e NEI contains source-level pollution data from 1990 to 2014,
albeit with gaps as it is currently released every three years. is limits our data between
1990 and 2006 withT = 10. It tracks several pollutants, but the most detailed data refer to the
so-called criteria pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx ), sulfur dioxide
(SO2), particulate maer smaller than 10 and 2.5 µm (PM10 and PM2.5, respectively), as well
as volatile organic compounds (VOCs). e rms in the sample change every year so, in
order to reduce biases, we average pollution by 4-digit SIC sub-industries.12
9e U.S. Geological Survey’s Yearbooks contain a wealth of information on U.S. mineral industries. We
refer the interested reader to their website for additional information: www.usgs.gov.
10See hp://www.nber.org/nberces/ for details. Last accessed October 30, 2017.
11See hps://www.epa.gov/air-emissions-inventories/national-emissions-inventory-nei for details. Last
accessed October 27, 2017.
12e NEI classied rms according to SIC until 2008 and subsequently changed to the North American
Industry Classication System (NAICS). To the best of our knowledge, there exists no direct concordance table
between SIC and NAICS beyond the 2002 version. To make data comparable across vintages, then, a two step
procedure is needed, in which rst SIC codes are mapped into 2002 NAICS using the Bureau of Economic
Analysis’ tables, and subsequently they are converted into 2007 NAICS codes.
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e top part of Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for the variables used for the DEA
estimations. e inputs are the real capital stock, the real energy and materials costs (all
measured in millions of 1997 US$) as well as the production worker hours, in millions. Output
is proxied by the real value shipped, also in millions of 1997 US$. e industries present
sucient variability for the purposes of our analysis but are relatively close in both size and
input ratios, conrming that DEA is a reasonable methodology to apply in this context.
e remaining variables in the top panel of Table 2.1 are pollutants emied in the course of
production. As shown in Table 2.5, most sectors in our sample are linked to the steel industry,
which we presently discuss in some more detail to explain the origin of the pollutants.
Generally speaking, the general process necessary to produce steel from iron ore or scrap is
relatively straightforward. Impurities such as nitrogen, silicon, phosphorus, sulfur and excess
carbon need to be removed from the raw iron, whereas so-called ‘alloying elements’ such as
manganese, nickel, chromium and vanadium are added to produce dierent grades of steel.
Today, two main large-scale commercial methods co-exist for making steel: basic oxygen
steel-making and electric arc furnace (EAF) steel-making. In basic oxygen steel-making
carbon-rich molten pig iron is made into steel by blowing oxygen through it, which lowers
the carbon content of the alloy and changes it into steel. is method initially requires
the heating up and crushing of limestone in a sinter plant. Both coke and natural gas are
used to generate heat, which makes sintering a pollution-intensive process entailing the
emission of CO, VOC, PM10, SO2 and NOx (EPA 2001, p. 28; Raczynsky and Watson 1999,
p. 327). In the second step of the process the sintered limestone, iron ore and coke are fed
into a blast furnace to produce pig iron, which is then poured into the basic oxygen furnace,
oen with scrap metal to obtain molten steel. is process is also a pollution-intensive and
emits PMs, SO2, CO and NOx (Sell, 1992). Alternatively, the use of EAFs entails the of use
scrap metal to make molten steel using electricity instead of natural gas and coke to heat
the metal. EAFs directly emit negligible pollution (Strezov et al., 2013). According to the
American Iron and Steel Institute around 60% percent of the plants use EAF and 40% uses
basic oxygen steel-making methods (American Iron and Steel Institute, 2016). Although each
plant typically only has one type of furnace, the data is compiled at the sub-industry level,
so that substitution between the two methods is possible. In the last step, all rms purify the
molten steel and make the castings. In the aluminium industry, rms rst crystallise bauxite
to aluminium oxide using natural gas. en the aluminium oxide is heated up to 150◦C and
becomes aluminium in an electrolyte chamber. Natural gas and electricity, together make up
more than 90% of the total energy consumption in the industry (EIA, 2006b). Aluminium
smelting implies the emission of PM10, PM2.5, SO2, CO, NOx , as well as VOC.
e secondary metal industry is similarly uniform in terms of the general production process.
Secondary metal rms buy primary metal plates or tubes manufactured in the primary
industry and perform operations such as de-oxidation, vacuum degassing, alloy addition,
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inclusion removal, inclusion chemistry modication, de-sulphurisation and homogenisation
to rene the metal, and produce dierent alloys and grades. Subsequently, the metal is
worked with rollers, blankers, and welders to shape their nal products. Table 2.7 compares
the primary and secondary metal industry and shows that the two groups of sub-sectors are
relatively dierent, the secondary industry being larger. e table also shows, however, that
the overall emissions of pollutants are instead rather similar across the groups. To control
for this we will include a secondary industry dummy variable that assumes the value of one
for all DMUs in the secondary industry and zero otherwise. Our regressions will include CO,
NOx and VOC because of data availability.13
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
First stage: Data envelopment analysis
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Real capital stock (MUS$) 2119.56 1091.96 705.5 4259.1 81
Production worker hours (Mh) 72.81 38.8 17.1 136.1 81
Real energy costs (MUS$) 97.48 66.79 14.95 300.08 81
Real materials costs (MUS$) 3179.08 1861.52 509.03 8047.61 81
Real value shipped (MUS$) 5615.23 3161.63 1311.45 13142.61 81
CO (tons) 3.65 6.22 0.09 31.75 81
NOx (tons) 6.22 6.29 0.45 27.43 81
SO2 (tons) 97.27 400.82 0 1991.47 70
VOC (tons) 34.09 24.42 1.59 97.75 81
NH3 (tons) 0.76 1.01 0.01 2.88 27
PM10 (tons) 6.26 6.45 0.02 21.17 35
PM2.5 (tons) 4.64 4.96 0.02 17.42 35
Second stage: panel estimation
Energy price 1.26 0.14 1.05 1.72 81
Natural gas price (US$/3) 4.27 1.68 2.93 8.56 81
Electricity price (US¢/kWh) 4.79 0.38 4.43 5.73 81
Coal price (US$/short ton) 26.55 3.8 23.92 36.8 81
Interest rate (%) 5.54 1.54 2.88 7.19 81
Average labour cost (,000s US$/employee) 26.23 4.39 16.95 38.4 81
Value added (MUS$) 3604.09 1977.95 1033.5 10036.8 81
Source: Author’s calculations on EPA NEI and NBER CES Manufacturing Database data.
Notes: 1990-2006 (with T = 10) and the decision making units are the subsectors of the metal industry.
13As we can see from the means and standard deviations in Table 2.1, there are a number of outliers. Since
DEA is outlier-sensitive, we use the blocked adaptive computationally ecient outlier nominators (BACON)
method to identify and eliminate such observations (Billor et al., 2000; Weber, 2010).
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e boom part of Table 2.1 sums up the variables used in the second-stage, where we use
input prices to explain the productivity indices computed in the rst stage. e interest
rate and the labour costs measures are used as proxies for the price of capital and labour,
respectively. e labour cost variable is created by dividing aggregate (production-related)
labour costs by the number of employees in the NBER CES database. e energy price is
the energy deator on each industry’s expenditures on seven types of energy as provided
in the NBER-CES database. Given the broad coverage and its (dis-)aggregation level, this
variable provides a comprehensive, DMU-level assessment of the price of energy, which we
use in our baseline regressions. To be able to gauge the impact of the price of individual
fuel types, however, we additionally resort to the data provided by the Energy Information
Administration on fuel prices faced by industrial consumers. We choose to use coal, natural
gas and electricity prices, because they account for over 70% of the total energy consumption
of metal rms.14 e price of coal refers to bituminous coal, which is the most commonly
used coal type in the metal industry. Energy prices tend to be highly correlated across fuel
types and over time, which makes the statistical identication of their relationship with the
outcome variable a very challenging proposition. In what follows, to facilitate our analysis,
we focus on the growth rates of prices over time rather than their levels nor do we include
lags and leads of prices within any given regression to limit the impact of serial correlation on
our results. Finally, Table 2.5 also reports the number of observations by pollutant, for each
SIC code. In what follow, we only consider SIC codes with at least 9 data points, resulting in
a maximum of 81 observations in our analysis below.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Data Envelopment Analysis
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the MPI measures the changes in productivity over time
experienced across dierent DMUs. For example the large improvement from 2001 to 2002,
seven out of the the 9 sectors had a large improvement M˜ENV , so one can’t say that the
results are driven by a single sector. M˜ECO moves slower than M˜ENV and they same to
move together relatively well (there are large exceptions for example, SIC 3354 in 1998 had
a productivity regress in ECO but a large productivity gain in ENV ). To get a sense of the
main trends, Figure 2.3a graphs the evolution of the two productivity indexes over time.
e lines plot the chained average MPIs, computed by rst averaging MPIs across DMUs in
each period, and then multiplying them over subsequent years. For example, the cumulative
14e remaining 30% mostly comes from byproducts of the manufacturing process, for which no market
price is available (EIA, 2002).
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economic index from time t0 until time T would be calculated as:
M˜ECO =
T∏
t=t0
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Mi,t
)
. (2.13)
e environmental MPI is calculated in a similar fashion, using the aggregateMENV in (2.11).
e advantage of estimating these cumulative indices is to get an intuition of the rst stage
and how do the individual productivity changes accumulate. is also allows us to plot
against the evolution of energy prices, which helps the intuition of our results beer than
ploing the productivity changes against the energy price changes.
It is evident even from a cursory inspection of Figure 2.3a that environmental productivity
grows much faster than economic productivity over the period spanned by our data. is
suggests that the productivity of polluting inputs has, on average, grown faster than the
productivity of ‘standard’ ones between 1990 and 2005, across the sub-industries we analyze.
is provides the rst suggestive evidence that technical change has been biased towards
polluting inputs in this instance. Interestingly, the graphs show evidence of co-movement
overall. Indeed, both graphs evolve quite closely until 1997; though we don’t observe the
years between 1990 and 1996, it is telling that the productivity increase between 1990 and
1996 is similar. In 1997 environmental productivity increases more rapidly until 1999 and
then very markedly so over the subsequent two years, with a slight decline aer 2002.
e economic MPI is more sluggish until 2000. It then increases, albeit less dramatically
than its environmental counterpart, exhibit a similar, if more muted, paern of growth and
subsequent decline over 2001-2005.
e possibility to decompose the MPIs into their eciency and technological change con-
stituents allows us to analyze in more depth the drivers of these aggregate paerns over time.
Starting from Figure 2.3b, which describes the technological change component of the MPIs,
it is striking how the environmental index has increased tenfold, peaking in 2002, whereas its
economic counterpart shows a much more muted dynamics, while still providing evidence
of some progress over time (at least until 2002). Figure 2.3c, which plots the evolution over
time of the cumulative (chained) changes in eciency, illustrates how there was virtually
no change in the overall economic eciency over the entire period of our study, implying
that the relative position of the DMUs in relation to the economic frontier has not changed.
In marked contrast, the DMUs under investigation show on average a rapid increase in
environmental eciency over the same period of time.
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(a) Economic (dashed) and environmental (solid) cumulative MPIs (correlation: 0.83).
(b) Economic (dashed) and environmental (solid) cumulative technical change indexes (correlation:
0.73).
(c) Economic (dashed) and environmental (solid) cumulative eciency change indexes (correlation:
0.34).
Figure 2.3: e Malmquist Productivity index and its components over time.
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Figure 2.4: Cumulative technical change indexes for individual pollutants.
Figure 2.5: Productivity and the average cost of energy.
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Taken in its entirety, this information leads us to conclude that the U.S. metal industry has
witnessed a surprising degree of (biased) environmental innovation during the period of
our study, and that such innovation has been the result of two types of changes. On the
one hand, there has been a substantial amount of technological change that has improved
the productivity of the front-runners in the industry. Indeed, the rapid growth in T˜CENV
suggests signicant shis outward of the best-practice frontier in the industry. On the other
hand, the parallel improvement captured by the time path of the E˜CENV component testies
of an industry in which even less ecient DMUs increasingly adopt best-practices from the
technology leaders and approach the frontier. Our analysis so far, therefore, suggests that
both bona de innovation and the diusion of existing technologies have played a role in the
environmental improvements observed in the industry around the turn of the century.
As discussed in Section 4.4, due to data availability, the environmental index is constructed
using information on the emissions of just three of the criteria pollutants: CO, NOx , and
VOCs. Looking at the evolution of each of the individual components of the MPI in (2.11)
is nevertheless instructive in order to understand what drives the rapid increase of M˜ENV .
Figure 2.4 plots the evolution over time of the average MPI for each of the pollutants. e
gure shows clearly that, while the productivity of each pollutant exhibits a qualitatively
similar path, in that the dierent indicators tend to move together, the graph of M˜CO
exhibits signicantly faster productivity gains over the period of our analysis. Signicantly,
this improvement took place in the absence of any change in the rules regulating carbon
emissions.
Table 2.8 reports the results of our year-on-year MPI estimation for each of the metal
manufacturing sub-industries (4-digit SIC codes) in our data set. e top panel of the table
refers to the economic MPI detailed in (2.9), whereas the boom half contains the estimates
for the environmental MPI, computed according to the expression in (2.11). e timing
convention is important here and in what follows; in our results the value for M˜ECO,t
indicates the productivity increase that occurs between time t and the following period in
which observations are available. us, for example M˜ECO,1999 refers to the productivity
growth between the years 1999 and 2000, but M˜ECO,2002 measures the change between 2002
and 2005. It’s interesting to observe that there were generally lile changes from 1990 to
1996 (under the column ’1990’). Since we can’t observe the years in between we assume that
the change is more or less linear (i.e. there wasn’t a productivity surge from 1990 to 1993 and
productivity decline 1993 to 1996). ere’s heterogeneity across the sector responses which
could be caused by a number of dierent factors (e.g. technological maturity, asymmetries
in energy use or dierences in vertical integration), but the main trends are more or less
the same. Table 2.9 and 2.10 report the EˆC and ˆTC components of the MPI. It seems that
while the technological component moves more or less simultaneously across DMUs, the
eciency change component (especially improvement) is mainly driven by individual DMUs.
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So it seems that given the technological frontier of the DMUS their distance stays the same.
is could imply that either there’s a constant lag between the frontier and the DMU or
the DMU is simply always ecient. To investigate the issue Figure 2.7a and 2.7b illustrates
the distribution of eciency scores. It seems that economic terms the DMUs are very
ecient; this implies that market encourages eciency. In general the DMUs also ecient
environmentally, but there’s a much larger spread of the eciency scores. is could also
explain the large individual changes in eciency. It seems that, in general, the production
frontier shi improves productivity.
A proper analysis of the drivers of these productivity increases is very important since it is
likely to provide crucial information to environmental regulators. erefore, we devote the
rest of the paper to this aspect.
In line with the induced innovation hypothesis, we focus on the role played by input prices
in driving the changes in the MPIs discussed above. Figure 2.5 illustrates the relationship
between the aggregate MPIs and the (average) price of energy in the industry, as measured
by the energy deator provided in the NBER-CES dataset. Transparently, a close positive
correlation emerges from the picture, whereby increases in the price of energy are linked
to (mostly environmental) productivity improvements. Not surprisingly, a similar paern
emerges when ploing the MPIs against the price of natural gas, electricity and coal, as
shown in Figures 2.6a-2.6c. While this conforms with our intuition, it is clear that a more
precise statistical investigation is warranted to gauge to what extent the data really support
the induced innovation hypothesis.
2.4.2 Second stage estimation
To investigate the relationship between input prices and productivity, we estimate equation
(2.12) using the method proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) and discussed in Section 2.2.2.
To exploit the panel variation in the data, our preferred strategy is to estimate the equation
using the 4-digit industry specic energy price deators provided with the NBER-CES data.
We run three sets of regressions using the energy price index at time t , t + 1, and t + 2,
which, given the timing convention we adopted for the MPIs, allows us to capture gauge to
what extent productivity responds to lagged, contemporaneous and future changes in prices,
respectively. One potential concern with this strategy, obviously, is the potential endogeneity
between the price of energy and the change in productivity: as prices increase and aect
productivity, the demand for energy by metal industries change as well, feeding back into
prices. Since the metal industry is responsible for only a small fraction of the overall amount
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(a) Natural gas price.
(b) Electricity price.
(c) Coal price.
Figure 2.6: Productivity and energy prices.
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Table 2.2: Explaining Productivity Changes: M˜ , T˜C and E˜C vs lagged energy prices
M˜ECO T˜CECO M˜ENV T˜CENV E˜CENV
∆ log(Energy deator)t 1.30 1.30 0.96 1.47 -5.83
(0.87) (0.94) (1.78) (1.43) (8.05)
∆ log(Interest rate)t -0.58*** -0.58*** -0.96* -1.80** 1.02
(0.18) (0.19) (0.52) (0.73) (1.34)
∆ log(Wage)t 1.08 1.08 -1.54 4.32 -8.70
(1.02) (1.04) (2.62) (3.42) (9.59)
log(Value added)t 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.14 0.45
(0.06) (0.06) (0.20) (0.29) (0.38)
Year gap dummy -0.04 -0.04 -0.15 0.53 -0.63
(0.09) (0.09) (0.19) (0.49) (0.63)
Secondary metal industry (dummy) -0.06 -0.06 -0.33** -0.92 -1.09
(0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.58) (0.79)
Constant 0.88* 0.88** -0.01 0.47 -0.72
(0.47) (0.45) (1.57) (2.32) (2.96)
Observations 81 81 81 81 81
R2 0.23 0.23 0.11 0.23 0.07
χ 2 27.93 27.50 39.94 21.10 7.74
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signicance, respectively. Time period for all regressions is 1990-2006
(with 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2003 and 2004 missing). us t +k refers to the end year +k years. For more information
about the timing convention see section 2.4.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. e signicance levels are computed
by applying Simar and Wilson’s 2007 algorithm A with 2000 repetitions.
of energy consumed every year in the United States (Only between 2 and 3%, according to
EIA, 2006a,b), however, it is unlikely that the behaviour of our DMUs has had a signicant
impact on prices.
Tables 2.2-2.4 present the results of this rst estimations. In each table, each column refers to
a dierent dependent variable, as indicated. e rst three refer to the aggregate economic
MPI and its components, whereas the last three refer to their ENV counterparts. As discussed
previously, the prices of the polluting inputs constitute the main variable of interest here,
whereas the other variables are used to control for the price of other factors, namely the
interest rate for the cost of capital, and the average wage rate as a proxy of the cost of labour.
e value added control is included to account for changes in the level of economic activity,
and thus of aggregate demand. We also include a dummy variable that identies observations
for which the gap to the following available observation is larger than one year and another
dummy that allows us to isolate primary metal industries from secondary ones.
Overall, the results suggest both the existence of a complex dynamic process of adjustment
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Table 2.3: Explaining Productivity Changes: M˜ , T˜C and E˜C vs energy price
expectations
M˜ECO T˜CECO M˜ENV T˜CENV E˜CENV
∆ log(Energy deator)t+2 0.99** 1.00*** 5.30** 4.21** 5.36
(0.46) (0.39) (2.45) (1.82) (4.14)
∆ log(Interest rate)t+2 -0.33 -0.34 0.02 -0.64 1.80
(0.25) (0.24) (0.55) (0.47) (1.73)
∆ log(Wage)t+2 0.93 0.93 2.36* 3.97 0.58
(0.90) (0.79) (1.36) (2.61) (4.78)
log(Value added)t+2 -0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.08 0.43
(0.10) (0.09) (0.19) (0.18) (0.47)
Year gap dummy -0.10 -0.09 -0.24* 0.47 -0.48
(0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.49) (0.33)
Secondary metal industry (dummy) -0.03 -0.03 -0.30* -0.87 -1.19
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.55) (0.81)
Constant 1.15 1.15* 0.55 0.89 -0.79
(0.71) (0.69) (1.47) (1.48) (3.47)
Observations 81 81 81 81 81
R2 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.07
χ 2 19.12 23.07 22.40 19.59 8.03
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signicance, respectively. Time period for all regressions is 1990-
2006 (with 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2003 and 2004 missing). us t + k refers to the end year +k years. For more
information about the timing convention see section 2.4.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. e signicance levels
are computed by applying Simar and Wilson’s 2007 algorithm A with 2000 repetitions.
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to changes in prices over time, and a signicant role played by price expectations. Starting
with the role of current prices in Table 2.4, what emerges is a picture whereby economic
productivity is negatively aected by increases in costs in the short run. e rst column of
Table 2.4 indeed suggests that as the price of energy and the cost of capital increase, the MPI
decreases. e fact that the whole eect on M˜ECO come from changes in the TC component
further suggests an overall pressure on the industry rather than signicant changes in the
relative performance of DMUs. e statistically signicant and negative coecient of energy
prices in the environmental MPI equation might be due to a relative shi towards cheaper
fuels, mostly coal, as a consequence of energy cost pressure. Since coal is also associated
with the largest carbon-intensity, this seems like a plausible explanation.
Table 2.2, which reports the results of the estimation of equation (2.12) using lagged prices,
shows, however, that these eects are short-lived. Indeed while the precision of the estimates
leaves a lot to be desired, the positive coecients in the rst row suggest that once DMUs
have time to adjust, price increases are associated with productivity gains. ese results also
chime with what we consider to be our main results in this part of the paper, namely the
estimates in Table 2.3. We interpret the sizeable and statistically signicant coecients in
the rst row of Table 2.3 as indicating that an expectation that the price of energy is likely to
increase leads to production adjustments, that in turn imply a more ecient use of the energy
inputs. ese changes result in an increase in the economic productivity driven by a shi in
the best practice frontier, and are associated with similar, and much larger increases on the
environmental side, especially in the primary metal industry. e fact that the metal industry
is a mature sector and that product innovation occurs only at a limited pace suggests that the
environmental improvements identied above are linked to process innovation. is is most
likely connected to the choice of fuel, e.g. black vs brown coal vs gas for heat generation,
and to a progressive shi away from blast furnaces and towards EAFs.
is laer aspect can be beer gauged by moving away from a single price for energy and
instead focusing on individual prices for the alternative energy sources available to the
industry. Including prices for dierent energy sources allows to emphasize the substitution
possibilities available to rms within sectors and across the industry. e available data,
unfortunately, suer from the obvious limitation of not having a panel structure, so that the
same price is imputed for all DMUs. Data limitations notwithstanding, the results reported
in Table 2.11 and 2.12 oer interesting insights. In both regressions, we include the (growth
rates of) the price of coal, natural gas and electricity. e rst two sources are mostly
substitutable in terms of process heat auto-production, whereas electricity is only indirectly
substitutable, as it allows metal production based on EAFs rather than on blast furnaces.
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 tell quite similar stories: an increase in the price of either coal or natural
gas tends to make EAFs relative more competitive and shis production away from pollution
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Table 2.4: Explaining Productivity Changes: M˜ , T˜C and E˜C vs current energy
prices
M˜ECO T˜CECO M˜ENV T˜CENV E˜CENV
∆ log(Energy deator)t+1 -1.46** -1.46** -5.28** -1.33 -5.19
(0.58) (0.62) (2.39) (1.57) (3.34)
∆ log(Interest rate)t+1 -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.68** -1.32** 0.06
(0.10) (0.11) (0.30) (0.58) (0.43)
∆ log(Wage)t+1 0.33 0.32 3.25 -0.20 3.52
(0.94) (0.98) (3.37) (1.70) (3.35)
log(Value added)t+1 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.13 0.52
(0.08) (0.08) (0.20) (0.31) (0.46)
Year gap dummy -0.06 -0.05 -0.11 0.51 -0.31
(0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.47) (0.35)
Secondary metal industry (dummy) -0.03 -0.03 -0.30 -0.87 -1.18
(0.11) (0.12) (0.20) (0.57) (0.84)
Constant 1.01* 1.01* -0.18 0.70 -1.83
(0.57) (0.55) (1.58) (2.56) (3.47)
Observations 81 81 81 81 81
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.06
χ 2 21.07 20.58 17.31 40.77 6.73
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signicance, respectively. Time period for all regressions is 1990-2006
(with 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2003 and 2004 missing). us t +k refers to the end year +k years. For more information
about the timing convention see section 2.4.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. e signicance levels are computed
by applying Simar and Wilson’s 2007 algorithm A with 2000 repetitions.
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intensive blast furnaces, thus increasing environmental productivity, especially in the sense
of shiing the best practice frontier upwards, as can be seen from the T˜CENV column in both
tables. Symmetrically, an increase in the relative cost of electricity favours more polluting
processes and reduces environmental productivity across DMUs. Interestingly, this process
also aects economic outcomes, in particular when changes are related to current rather
than expected prices.
Our results overall comply with our intuition and point to three main conclusions. First,
we nd evidence of induced innovation as our regressions indicate that DMUs respond
to changes in expected prices by planning ahead, and improving their productivity, both
in terms of economic and environmental performance. e environmental improvements
most refer to changes in the TC component of the MPIs, further suggesting that indeed
we nd ourselves in the presence of bona de innovation. is result is interesting and
seemingly robust. Indeed, Table 2.13 shows that, even excluding the years for which we do
not have consecutive observations and which could bias our results, we observe a similar
paern to the one that emerges from the discussion above. While not surprising from the
econometric point of view – indeed the dummy we introduced to control for the gap in the
data was virtually never statistically signicant– this result is still comforting in terms of the
robustness of our results. Similarly, we re-estimate our regression in Table 2.3 separately for
primary and secondary sectors, to control for dierences in their core activities. Tables 2.14
and 2.15 present the results of these estimations and show that broadly speaking the results
are robust to this additional split, despite the lack of statistical signicance in the primary
producers regressions, possibly a consequence of the very limited number of observations.
e second lesson that we can draw is that, when we regress MPIs on current price changes,
i.e. when we look at price changes that happen during the period of the productivity
measurement, adjustment is more challenging, the economic productivity suers and the
environmental performance of the DMUs worsens. ese impacts tend to fade over time,
however, as evidenced by the fact that lagged prices do not exhibit any signicant correlation
with the productivity of DMUs across the industries in our sample.
Finally, when looking at changes in the individual prices of dierent energy sources, we nd,
not surprisingly, that the environmental performance of the DMUs crucially depend on the
relative price of fossil fuels vs the price of electricity. As fossil fuels prices increase, producers
making use of EAFs and those who rely on electricity directly become more competitive
gaining market share, so that output increases and emissions (in the industry) decrease. is
is not per se an indication of induced innovation, but provides evidence that the purposeful
modication of relative prices – via policy interventions, for example – may signicantly
aect the environmental productivity of manufacturing sectors.
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2.5 Conclusions
In this paper we set out to test Hicks’s (1932) induced innovation hypothesis; that increases
in the price of productive inputs would lead innovators to develope new ways to economize
on their use. e existing literature on the issue relies on self-reported R&D expenditures or,
more commonly, on patents counts as proxies for innovation eorts. In our view, however,
(induced) innovation is a much more complex process than the mere development of new
types of blueprints or patents. It is rather a function of how (existing or new) technologies are
applied in practice via changes in processes, management practices and novel applications
of tacit knowledge. It follows that the sole availability of the technology represents at best a
necessary condition, but it is clearly far from sucient.
In our analysis we have used methods from productivity analysis that exploit available data
on the actual behaviour of DMUs – such as revenue and cost data – to estimate changes in
eciency and productivity over time and across industries. In the second stage of our work we
further investigated the link between changes in productivity, eciency and technology and
the evolution of input prices over time. We see this methodology as been more appropriate
to the question at hand than either of the alternatives mentioned before and, thus, more
suited to investigate whether changes in energy prices do in fact lead to eciency gains.
e results from our DEA analysis of the U.S. metal industry provide convincing evidence
that productivity changes in the industry were indeed signicantly biased towards polluting
inputs between 1990 and 2008. Furthermore, the MPI decomposition emphasizes that both
bona de innovation and technology diusion contributed to this paern.
In the second part of our work, we correlate these changes in productivity with the evolution
over time of the relevant energy prices. We nd that DMUs do indeed respond to expected
changes in energy prices improving both their economic and environmental performance.
Furthermore, the environmental improvements we identify almost invariably emerge as the
result of changes in the technical change component of the MPIs, suggesting that DMUs
consistently develop and apply technologies that push the environmental frontier outwards.
ese results are in line with the ndings of Popp (2002) and Ley et al. (2016), for example.
While these papers refer to patenting activity, however, our methodology uses actual costs
and revenue data. In this respect, our analysis uncovers evidence that innovation eorts
do have real eects. Whether these are causally correlated to the increasing availability of
patents, however, is not something our analysis can address. e discussion of these aspects
is le for future research.
e results of our analysis in this paper indicate that the induced innovation hypothesis
is strongly supported by the data. We nd evidence that both the improvement of current
best practices and the adoption of existing ones by relatively less productive DMUs are
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sensitive to changes in relative prices. Our results may thus be seen as a strong endorsement
of policy interventions that pursue the purposeful modication of relative prices, e.g. via
market-based instruments. Indeed, our work suggests that such interventions could be quite
successful in bringing about market conditions that are conducive to a more ecient use of
polluting inputs.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Table 2.5: Industry list by SIC code and number of observations by pollutant
Name SIC code CO NOx VOC PM10 PM2.5 SO2 NH3
Steel Wiredrawing and Steel Nails and Spikes 3315 10 10 10 8 7 9 3
Steel Pipe and Tubes 3317 7 7 10 8 7 7 6
Gray and Ductile Iron Foundries 3321 10 10 10 8 7 10 6
Steel Investment Foundries 3324 10 10 10 8 7 10 3
Steel Foundries, Not Elsewhere Classied 3325 10 10 10 8 7 10 6
Secondary Smelting and Rening of Nonferrous Metals 3341 10 10 10 8 7 10 7
Rolling, Drawing, and Extruding of Copper 3351 9 7 10 8 7 6 6
Aluminium Sheet, Plate, and Foil 3353 9 10 10 8 7 9 8
Aluminium Extruded Products 3354 10 10 10 8 7 7 6
Metal cans 3411 10 10 10 8 7 10 6
Metal barrels, drums and pails 3412 10 7 10 6 5 7 3
Hand and edge tools, not elsewhere classied 3423 6 9 10 6 5 6 3
Hardware, not elsewhere classied 3429 7 7 10 6 5 7 6
Plumbing xture ings and transformation 3432 10 10 10 8 7 10 3
Heating equipment, except electric 3433 9 9 10 8 7 9 3
Fabricated structural metal 3441 10 10 10 8 7 10 3
Metal doors, sash and trim 3442 10 10 10 8 7 6 3
Fabricated plate work 3443 7 7 10 8 7 7 7
Sheet metalwork 3444 7 7 10 6 5 7 6
Architectural metal work 3446 9 9 10 8 7 6 3
Prefabricated metal buildings 3448 10 10 10 7 6 9 3
Miscellaneous metal work 3449 10 7 10 5 4 6 3
Metal stampings, not elsewhere classied 3469 7 10 10 8 7 7 6
Plating and polishing 3471 7 7 10 6 5 7 6
Metal coating and allied services 3479 10 10 10 8 7 10 6
Ammunition, exc. small arms, n. e. c. 3483 6 9 9 5 4 6 6
Valve and pipe ings, not elsewhere classied 3494 9 9 10 7 6 6 6
Misc. fabricated wire products 3496 10 10 10 8 7 7 3
Fabricated metal products, not elsewhere classied 3499 10 10 10 8 7 10 6
Source: EPA NEI, NBER CES Manufacturing database and U.S. Census Bureau’s Subject Series General Summary (Appendix C).
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Table 2.7: Primary and secondary metal industry: comparison of key indicators
All Primary Secondary Dierence
Real value shipped (MUS$) 5615.23 3110.26 6330.94 -6.14
(3161.63) (1448.51) (3159.18) (0.00)
Production worker hours (Mh) 72.81 41.85 81.65 -7.33
(38.80) (9.15) (39.52) (0.00)
Real materials costs (MUS$) 3179.08 1882.07 3549.65 -4.35
(1861.52) (1294.64) (1839.51) (0.00)
Real energy costs (MUS$) 97.48 107.12 94.73 0.90
(66.79) (43.45) (72.14) (0.37)
CO (tons) 3.65 3.69 3.64 0.05
(6.22) (2.83) (6.90) (0.96)
VOC (tons) 34.09 39.61 32.52 0.85
(24.42) (33.57) (21.19) (0.41)
NOx (tons) 6.22 9.92 5.16 2.20
(6.29) (8.81) (4.96) (0.04)
SO2 (tons) 97.27 392.11 16.86 1.79
(400.82) (810.34) (65.60) (0.09)
NH3 (tons) 0.76 1.14 0.62 1.04
(1.01) (1.21) (0.93) (0.33)
PM10 (tons) 6.26 9.58 5.27 1.43
(6.45) (7.93) (5.76) (0.19)
PM2.5 (tons) 4.64 7.73 3.73 1.60
(4.96) (6.70) (4.03) (0.14)
Source: Author’s calculations on EPA NEI and NBER CES Manufacturing Database data.
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Table 2.8: Productivity Estimates
MˆECO,it
SIC code 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005
3324 0.787 0.986 1.043 2.073 1.014 0.978 1.338 1.593 0.686
3354 0.808 1.029 0.981 0.604 0.948 1.019 1.575 0.974 0.583
3432 1.072 0.911 1.043 0.589 0.992 0.982 1.911 0.551 0.292
3441 1.691 1.098 0.995 0.657 1.025 0.971 1.245 1.197 0.454
3442 1.046 1.097 0.979 1.798 1.046 1.003 1.060 0.889 1.182
3448 1.589 0.982 1.012 0.417 0.986 0.902 2.015 1.029 1.136
3479 1.119 0.993 1.033 0.884 1.034 0.968 1.171 1.031 1.065
3496 0.345 1.032 0.981 1.305 1.011 0.960 0.982 0.893 0.602
3499 0.885 1.064 1.016 0.599 1.004 0.927 1.663 1.281 0.647
MˆENV ,it
SIC code 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005
3324 0.498 1.022 1.093 2.182 0.957 0.899 1.089 2.995 0.705
3354 0.565 1.330 1.141 5.024 0.902 1.007 2.324 0.954 0.817
3432 1.207 0.899 1.182 0.373 1.830 0.646 1.515 0.956 0.544
3441 1.795 1.739 0.918 0.737 0.903 0.696 1.486 1.257 0.751
3442 0.698 1.418 1.287 0.937 1.072 1.021 0.908 0.851 1.161
3448 1.535 0.981 1.032 1.035 0.978 0.751 4.182 0.363 1.204
3479 1.066 1.214 1.097 0.455 1.142 0.744 2.557 1.812 1.251
3496 0.277 1.364 1.112 2.569 1.023 0.871 0.712 0.818 0.599
3499 0.719 1.042 1.036 1.301 1.033 0.388 6.539 1.712 0.851
Notes: e table reports the results of the year-on-year Malmquist productivity index estimation for each of
the 4-digit SIC codes for metal manufacturing. In each column we indicate the productivity increase that occurs
between the year indicated and the following period for which observation are available, thus the 1990 column
refers to productivity increases between 1990 and 1996, for example.
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Table 2.9: Eciency change estimates
EˆCECO,it
SIC code 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005
3324 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3354 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3432 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3441 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3442 0.997 1.003 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3448 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3479 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3496 0.981 1.019 1 1 1 1 1 0.987 1.013
3499 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
EˆCENV ,it
SIC code 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005
3324 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3354 0.351 0.734 1.034 21.818 1 1 1 0.121 0.869
3432 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3441 1.559 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3442 0.739 0.576 1.712 1.583 1 1 0.636 0.788 2.237
3448 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.277 3.944
3479 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3496 0.723 1.435 1 1 1 1 1 0.496 0.81
3499 1 1 1 1 1 0.355 8.591 1 1
Notes: e table reports the results of the year-on-year eciency change index estimation for each of the 4-digit SIC codes
for metal manufacturing. In each column we indicate the productivity increase that occurs between the year indicated and
the following period for which observation are available, thus the 1990 column refers to productivity increases between
1990 and 1996, for example.
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Table 2.10: Technological change estimates
ˆTCECO,it
SIC code 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005
3324 0.787 0.986 1.043 2.073 1.014 0.978 1.338 1.593 0.686
3354 0.807 1.029 0.981 0.604 0.948 1.019 1.575 0.974 0.583
3432 1.072 0.911 1.043 0.589 0.992 0.982 1.911 0.551 0.292
3441 1.691 1.098 0.995 0.657 1.025 0.971 1.245 1.197 0.454
3442 1.050 1.094 0.979 1.798 1.046 1.003 1.060 0.889 1.182
3448 1.589 0.982 1.012 0.417 0.986 0.902 2.015 1.029 1.136
3479 1.119 0.993 1.033 0.884 1.034 0.968 1.171 1.031 1.065
3496 0.352 1.012 0.981 1.305 1.011 0.960 0.982 0.904 0.594
3499 0.885 1.064 1.016 0.599 1.004 0.927 1.663 1.281 0.647
ˆTCENV ,it
SIC code 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005
3324 0.498 1.022 1.093 2.182 0.957 0.899 1.089 2.995 0.705
3354 3.814 2.130 1.107 0.358 0.902 1.007 2.324 11.171 1.052
3432 1.207 0.899 1.182 0.373 1.830 0.646 1.515 0.956 0.544
3441 1.192 1.739 0.918 0.737 0.903 0.696 1.486 1.257 0.751
3442 0.934 2.593 0.767 0.690 1.072 1.021 1.515 1.128 0.525
3448 1.535 0.981 1.032 1.035 0.978 0.751 4.182 1.445 0.312
3479 1.066 1.214 1.097 0.455 1.142 0.744 2.557 1.812 1.251
3496 0.415 0.974 1.112 2.569 1.023 0.871 0.712 1.665 0.752
3499 0.719 1.042 1.036 1.301 1.033 1.543 0.952 1.712 0.851
Notes: e table reports the results of the year-on-year technical change index estimation for each of the 4-digit SIC codes
for metal manufacturing. In each column we indicate the productivity increase that occurs between the year indicated and
the following period for which observation are available, thus the 1990 column refers to productivity increases between
1990 and 1996, for example.
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Table 2.11: Explaining Productivity Changes: M˜ , T˜C and E˜C vs current multiple
energy prices.
M˜ECO T˜CECO M˜ENV T˜CENV E˜CENV
∆ log(Coal price)t+1 3.99 4.00 7.27 13.31** -22.59
(3.05) (2.61) (7.58) (5.96) (27.86)
∆ log(Natural gas price)t+1 0.38 0.38* 0.59 3.25*** -3.73
(0.27) (0.22) (0.76) (1.24) (3.09)
∆ log(Electricity price)t+1 -5.37** -5.37*** -12.53** -22.82*** 15.80
(2.23) (1.75) (5.98) (7.79) (20.36)
∆ log(Interest rate)t+1 -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.42* -0.76** -0.27
(0.08) (0.08) (0.25) (0.38) (0.47)
∆ log(Wage)t+1 -0.43 -0.44 1.92 -4.40* 7.50
(0.90) (0.80) (3.61) (2.61) (8.21)
log(Value added)t -0.00 -0.00 0.21 0.07 0.77
(0.10) (0.09) (0.28) (0.35) (0.90)
Year gap dummy 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.88 -0.44
(0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.58) (0.38)
Secondary metal industry (dummy) -0.03 -0.03 -0.34 -0.83 -1.38
(0.13) (0.13) (0.24) (0.56) (1.22)
Constant 1.10 1.10* -0.15 1.42 -3.77
(0.75) (0.61) (2.13) (2.77) (6.70)
Observations 81 81 81 81 81
R2 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.09
χ 2 80.05 88.82 88.77 136.19 11.75
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signicance, respectively. Time period for all regressions is 1990-2006
(with 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2003 and 2004 missing). us t + k refers to the end year +k years. For more information
about the timing convention see section 2.4.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. e signicance levels are computed by
applying Simar and Wilson’s 2007 algorithm A with 2000 repetitions.
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Table 2.12: Explaining Productivity Changes: M˜ , T˜C and E˜C vs multiple energy
prices expectations.
M˜ECO T˜CECO M˜ENV T˜CENV E˜CENV
∆ log(Coal price)t+2 0.04 0.05 2.01 9.39* 1.41
(1.00) (1.03) (2.39) (5.38) (3.70)
∆ log(Natural gas price)t+2 0.81*** 0.82*** 2.78*** 2.82** 3.71
(0.21) (0.20) (1.07) (1.26) (2.46)
∆ log(Electricity price)t+2 -3.01** -3.04** -7.43* -14.09* -8.31
(1.29) (1.39) (4.33) (8.32) (9.41)
∆ log(Interest rate)t+2 -0.40 -0.41 -0.04 -0.50 1.78
(0.30) (0.28) (0.66) (0.57) (2.33)
∆ log(Wage)t+2 0.12 0.11 -0.38 -1.44 -2.02
(0.86) (1.19) (2.29) (3.48) (9.86)
log(Value added)t+2 0.01 0.01 0.12 -0.06 0.46
(0.09) (0.08) (0.19) (0.37) (0.63)
Year gap dummy -0.08 -0.08 -0.28* 0.14 -0.46
(0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.33) (0.44)
Secondary metal industry (dummy) -0.04 -0.04 -0.28 -0.77 -1.18
(0.14) (0.12) (0.18) (0.58) (0.98)
Constant 0.95 0.95 0.54 2.22 -1.00
(0.68) (0.62) (1.41) (3.02) (4.86)
Observations 81 81 81 81 81
R2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.10
χ 2 35.93 37.27 41.01 56.56 11.39
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signicance, respectively. Time period for all regressions is 1990-
2006 (with 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2003 and 2004 missing). us t + k refers to the end year +k years. For more
information about the timing convention see section 2.4.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. e signicance levels
are computed by applying Simar and Wilson’s 2007 algorithm A with 2000 repetitions.
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Table 2.13: Explaining Productivity Changes: M˜ , T˜C and E˜C vs energy price
expectations (1996-2001)
M˜ECO T˜CECO M˜ENV T˜CENV E˜CENV
∆ log(Energy deator)t+2 1.13*** 1.13*** 5.54** 2.25* 6.18
(0.35) (0.37) (2.65) (1.25) (5.65)
∆ log(Interest rate)t+2 -0.28 -0.28 -0.02 -0.13 1.95
(0.22) (0.24) (0.74) (0.38) (2.60)
∆ log(Wage)t+2 1.67** 1.64** 3.54 1.98 2.39
(0.66) (0.72) (3.33) (2.36) (9.70)
log(Value added)t+2 -0.09 -0.09 0.02 -0.21 0.84
(0.15) (0.05) (0.34) (0.18) (1.04)
Secondary metal industry (dummy) -0.03 -0.03 -0.34 0.06 -2.08
(0.14) (0.08) (0.37) (0.17) (1.64)
Constant 1.66 1.65*** 1.23 2.70** -3.46
(1.13) (0.38) (2.59) (1.35) (7.73)
Observations 54 54 54 54 54
R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.09
χ 2 22.11 27.01 7.76 5.65 4.22
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signicance, respectively. Time period for all regressions is 1990-
2006 (with 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2003 and 2004 missing). us t + k refers to the end year +k years. For more
information about the timing convention see section 2.4.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. e signicance levels
are computed by applying Simar and Wilson’s 2007 algorithm A with 2000 repetitions.
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Table 2.14: Explaining Productivity Changes: M˜ , T˜C and E˜C vs
energy price expectations (primary sector only)
M˜ECO T˜CECO M˜ENV T˜CENV
∆ log(Energy deator)t+2 2.89 2.89 12.87* 10.49
(2.01) (1.82) (7.80) (10.03)
∆ log(Interest rate)t+2 -0.06 -0.06 1.73 -2.01**
(0.40) (0.36) (2.11) (0.90)
∆ log(Wage)t+2 2.92*** 2.92*** 4.80 12.16
(1.11) (1.11) (15.11) (19.81)
log(Value added)t+2 -0.37** -0.37** 0.52 3.14*
(0.16) (0.15) (0.89) (1.65)
Year gap dummy -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.44 2.88*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.60) (1.50)
Constant 3.79*** 3.79*** -2.43 -23.71*
(1.11) (1.03) (6.91) (12.29)
Observations 18 18 18 18
R2 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.36
χ 2 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.36
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signicance, respectively. Time period for all
regressions is 1990-2006 (with 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2003 and 2004 missing). us t + k
refers to the end year +k years. For more information about the timing convention see section
2.4.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. e signicance levels are computed by applying
Simar and Wilson’s 2007 algorithm A with 2000 repetitions.
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Table 2.15: Explaining Productivity Changes: M˜ , T˜C and E˜C vs energy
price expectations (secondary sector only)
M˜ECO T˜CECO M˜ENV T˜CENV E˜CENV
∆ log(Energy deator)t+2 0.71** 0.72* 4.35** 2.59* 1.81
(0.35) (0.37) (2.13) (1.57) (2.65)
∆ log(Interest rate)t+2 -0.43 -0.44 -0.54 -0.30 -0.26
(0.27) (0.28) (0.52) (0.39) (0.55)
∆ log(Wage)t+2 0.20 0.19 0.99 2.71 -3.28
(0.63) (0.61) (1.46) (1.71) (2.00)
log(Value added)t+2 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.04 0.16
(0.11) (0.10) (0.17) (0.12) (0.16)
Year gap dummy -0.07 -0.07 -0.18* -0.08 -0.06
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12)
Constant 0.94 0.94 0.54 1.33 -0.08
(0.89) (0.76) (1.39) (0.94) (1.38)
Observations 63 63 63 63 63
R2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.04
χ 2 12.34 12.71 12.41 5.08 8.61
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signicance, respectively. Time period for all regressions
is 1990-2006 (with 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2003 and 2004 missing). us t + k refers to the end year
+k years. For more information about the timing convention see section 2.4.1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. e signicance levels are computed by applying Simar and Wilson’s 2007 algorithm A with
2000 repetitions.
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Table 2.16: Explaining Environmental Productivity
Changes: M˜ , T˜C and E˜C vs energy price expectations
(weighing by emissions of pollutants)
M˜ENV T˜CENV E˜CENV
∆ log(Energy deator)t+2 5.95*** 5.39*** 2.95
(2.06) (1.65) (2.67)
∆ log(Interest rate)t+2 0.06 -0.51 1.05
(0.50) (0.49) (1.09)
∆ log(Wage)t+2 3.88** 5.57** -1.75
(1.73) (2.72) (3.56)
log(Value added)t+2 0.06 0.04 0.23
(0.17) (0.16) (0.20)
Year gap dummy -0.16 0.38 -0.26
(0.13) (0.36) (0.27)
SIC dummy -0.36** -0.71*** -0.59
(0.18) (0.24) (0.46)
Constant 0.99 1.11 0.12
(1.25) (1.29) (1.42)
Observations 81 81 81
R2 0.16 0.21 0.06
χ 2 53.03 77.01 7.29
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signicance, respectively.
Time period for all regressions is 1990-2006 (with 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995,
2003 and 2004 missing). us t + k refers to the end year +k years. For more
information about the timing convention see section 2.4.1. Robust standard er-
rors in parentheses. e signicance levels are computed by applying Simar and
Wilson’s 2007 algorithm A with 2000 repetitions.
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(a) Environmental eciency scores (average ϕs).
(b) Economic eciency scores (θ ).
Figure 2.7: Distribution of eciency scores.
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Chapter 3
Porter hypothesis in the U.S.
manufacturing: An instrumented
stochastic frontier model
Abstract: e present paper revisits the ”strong” Porter hypothesis using a stochastic frontier
model. Taking advantage of a new proxy for stringency and weather instruments it estimates
the impact of stringent energy policy on the ineciency of state-level manufacturing. e
Porter hypothesis is strongly supported. is result is robust to time eects, controlling
energy prices, state heterogeneity and corrections for endogeneity.
3.1 Introduction
”Strict environmental regulations do not inevitably hinder competitive advantage against
rivals; indeed they oen enhance it” suggested Michael Porter in 1991 (Porter, 1991, p. 108).
is simple, but counter-intuitive idea had considerable political success, even though (or
especially since) it went against the intellectual currents of the time (Jae et al., 1995, p.
133). In the following years several economists examined it both in theoretical and empirical
models. arter of a century later there’s still lile consensus on what has come to be known
as the Porter hypothesis (PH).
e Porter hypothesis posits that environmental regulation enhances competitive advantage
through ve mechanisms (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995): (1) it highlights resource ine-
ciencies, (2) it raises corporate awareness of environmental issues, (3) it reduces uncertainty
about the protability of future investments, (4) it creates pressure to innovate, (5) it levels
the competition during an environment-friendly transition (i.e. opportunistic rms can’t gain
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advantage by avoiding environmental investment). e mechanisms suggest an imperfect
world where rms have slacks and production ineciencies, as Porter and Van der Linde
(1995) state ”[…] the world does not t the Panglossian belief that rms always make optimal
choices” (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995, p. 99); rms are sometimes inecient. Methods of
productivity analysis, with their focus on ineciency, seem to be the perfect empirical tool
to address the PH. Notwithstanding this clear complementarity, few studies to date have
investigated the PH with eciency analysis.
In this paper, we revisit the Porter hypothesis with a stochastic eciency analysis using
state-level data of manufacturing. Using a new proxy for stringency and an instrumental
variable approach, we estimate the causal eect of strict policy on ineciency. Our ndings
show a strong impact of stringent policy on ineciency. e results show that 2% stricter
policy (which is 1 point increase on the 0-50 scale policy score) decreases ineciency by
1.4% (see Section 3.4). If we assume linearity in the response this translates to a -0.7 elasticity
of ineciency with respect to policy stringency.
Jae and Palmer (1997a) classied the literature on the PH into three strands: ”narrow”,
”weak”, and ”strong”; this classication has become accepted as a general guide to the
literature (see e.g. Ambec et al., 2013). e ”narrow” strand compares regulations, testing
Porter and Van der Linde’s (1995) claim, that exible regulations enhance productivity more
than prescriptive ones (e.g. Butraw, 2000; Driesen, 2005), or how do various regulations aect
the costs of adjustment. Although the limitations of data bounds the scope of these studies, in
general they found that more exible policies are less costly than prescriptive ones, partially
because they lead to more innovations. e ”weak” strand of literature examines how do
regulations aect innovations (e.g. Brunneimer and Cohen, 2003; Popp, 2006). Most studies
conrm the weak form of the PH; regulations induce innovations. Finally, the ”strong” PH
literature asks how do regulations aect rms’ competitiveness, which may be proxied in
dierent manners depending on the research objective. e present paper ts within the
”strong” branch, therefore we review the ”strong” literature. From here on ’Porter hypothesis’
refers to the strong version. For a recent literature review including the other strands see
Ambec et al. (2013).
Most studies nd negative or no eect of regulations - usually proxied by abatement costs
- on competitiveness (e.g. Gray, 1987; Barbera and McConnell, 1990; Dufour et al., 1998;
Alpay et al., 2002; Gray and Shadbegian, 2003; Managi et al., 2005; Bo¨hringer et al., 2012;
Broberg et al., 2013; Rubashkina et al., 2015); few studies nd positive eect in this framework
(Berman and Bui, 2001; Lanoie et al., 2008). Abatement costs (and related variables), however,
are oen said to be unreliable measures for regulation stringency. Berman and Bui (2001)
write that ”abatement costs may severely overstate the true cost of environmental regulation”,
because abatement technologies may increase productivity, so a rm may invest in abatement
technologies without any added incentive from environmental regulation - making abatement
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costs partially endogenous (Berman and Bui, 2001, p. 509). Ambec et al. (2013) argue that large
abatement costs may be caused by other factors than policy, such as older plants or energy
prices. Besides the PH ”does not posit that higher abatement costs will lead to innovation”
(Ambec et al., 2013, p. 14). Similarly Broberg et al. (2013) posit that ”environmental investment
will […] not correctly reect regulation stringency”, because rms may improve their image
by environmental investments (Broberg et al., 2013, p. 53). ey also add that the survey
question may lead to inconsistent data, as dierent rms categorise their environmental
investment in dierent ways.
Studies with dierent stringency proxies paint a subtler picture. Lanoie et al. (2011) use a
seven-country OECD survey to estimate the eects of perceived environmental stringency
on business performance and nd a positive correlation. Greenstone et al. (2012) nd positive
eect of CO regulation on plant level TFP, but negative eect of every other pollutant. ey
proxy regulations with the aainment of plants/counties. Earnhart and Rassier (2016) apply
an index number to examine the eect of regulations on return to sales in the US. eir
results show that loose monitoring makes the PH true. Albrizio et al. (2017a) use an index
number to estimate the eect of stringent environmental policy on industries and rms.
ey nd that strigent environmental policy enhances the productivity of productive rms,
while it slows the less productive ones. Franco and Marin (2017) nd that tax-intensity drives
productivity both in up- and in down-stream electricity sectors. e stringency proxy seems
important: estimations with abatement costs overwhelmingly contradict the PH, with other
proxies they lend qualied support.
e present paper’s chosen proxy is a policy index. Brunel and Levinson (2016) compare
proxies of environmental stringency and show that there’s no perfect measure; each has
its merits and shortcomings. An index number could be more comprehensive than the
others (appropriate for the PH), but its coecient is dicult to interpret. While this is a just
criticism, it is also true that the Porter hypothesis suggests an (economically signicant)
positive eect, but it’s silent about the exact magnitudes. To help the interpretation and
intuition, the results are presented as ’elasticities’: how does 1-2% increase in stringency
aect ineciency?
Another aspect oen overlooked in the literature is the possible endogeneity of the envi-
ronmental policy (Brunel and Levinson, 2016). As we argue in Section 3.3, (the lack of)
competitiveness could inuence the strictness of environmental policy; to control for the en-
dogeneity we use an instrumental variable estimation, with the frequency of thunderstorms
and average wind speed as instruments (to the best of our knowledge Rubashkina et al. 2015,
are the only ones to date, to explicitly address this issue).
e contribution of this paper is threefold: rsts, instead of abatement costs we use a state-
level policy index to proxy environmental regulations. As we argued above a policy index is
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Figure 3.1: Composed error of stochastic frontier model.
more aligned with the spirit Porter hypothesis. Second, we follow Porter and Van der Linde
(1995) and relax the assumption of ecient rms. Finally, we address the endogeneity of
policies with an IV estimation.
e rest of the paper is structured as follows. e next section outlines the methodology.
Section 3.3 introduces the data. Section 3.4 presents and discusses the results. e last section
concludes.
3.2 Porter hypothesis in an ineciency framework
As we said in the Introduction, eciency analysis can be seen as the ideal empirical tool to
address the Porter hypothesis, given its focus on rms’ ineciency. Fig. 3.1 displays a simple
one input, one output stochastic frontier model.1 e dot shows a rm, which operates
inside the production possibility set, below the production function, f (x). Part of the total
shortfall (εi ) is random error, vi ; the other part of it ineciency, ui . us, in this example, a
direct comparison to f (x) overestimates ineciency; the proper comparison is with f0(x),
the frontier available for the rm.
According to the Porter hypothesis an exogenous environmental policy might motivate the
rm to close the gap between its production point and f0(x), thus eliminating ineciency
(ui ) by raising awareness, highlighting ineciencies or inducing managerial innovations
(Porter and Van der Linde, 1995, p. 99-100).
1Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and Greene (2008) provide introductions and detailed overviews of the eld.
For review of the recent literature see Parmeter and Kumbhakar (2014).
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In a simple model with M inputs:
yi = f (xi)︸︷︷︸
Deterministic
−ui +vi︸   ︷︷   ︸
Stochastic (εi )
. (3.1)
Where yi is rm i’s output, xi is its 1 ×M input vector. e production function shows the
deterministic part of the production, while the composed error term (εi ) is the stochastic
part (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977). Ineciency (ui ) is one-sided,
because a rm can’t produce more than the production function, only equal or less. e
random error, vi , on the other hand, is two-sided. Ideally one not only estimates ineciency
(ui ), but also the eect of environmental variables (zi ) on ineciency. e drawbacks of
two-step approach (i.e. estimating ui ’s, then regressing them on the environmental variables)
are well-established (Schmidt, 2011). It’s generally agreed that if environmental variables are
omied in the rst step, the coecient estimates will be biased - akin to the omied variable
bias in a linear regression model. is bias would be carried forward to the second step -
both in the mean and the standard error of the ineciency distribution (Wang and Schmidt,
2002; Greene, 2008). A single step estimation is preferred, but how do the environmental
variables t in the estimation diers from model to model.
In this paper we assume that scaling property is true (Wang, 2002). e scaling property
states that
uit (zit ,δ) = h(zit ,δ)u∗,
where h(.) is the scaling function, which scales the basic variable, u∗; δ is a parameter vector
to be estimated. e economic intuition is that rms have the same potential for eciency,
but they exploit that potential to dierent extents based on their environmental variables
(zit ) alvarez2006interpreting. We choose the exponential function as the scaling function,
h(zit ,δ) = exp(z′itδ), because it’s easy to interpret the marginal eects: ∂ ln(u)/∂z = δ ,
a unit increase in z increases ineciency (u) by δ percentages. e scaling property is a
distribution-free approach, so one needn’t assume a specic distribution for u∗ (Simar et al.,
1994b).
For the sake of generality, we specify a translog production function2:
lnyit = α + ΣMj βj ln(xj,it ) + ΣMj ΣMk βjk ln(xj,it ) ln(xj,it ) − uit +vit (3.2)
vit ∼ N (0,σ 2v ) uit = exp(z′itδ)u∗.
Where β ’s are parameters to be estimated and assumed to be symmetric βjk = βkj .3
2e F-test also indicated signicant gains choosing translog over Cobb-Douglas functional form.
3Equation (3.2) could be simply estimated with non-linear least squares. Since uit measures the possible
output gap, given the inputs, it indicates the output-oriented ineciency.
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Using instrumental variables in a stochastic frontier seing is a new research topic, still in
its infancy (Tran and Tsionas, 2015; Amsler et al., 2016). With the scaling property, however,
instrumental variable estimation ts relatively easily into the stochastic framework. Amsler
et al. (2016) have shown that the standard IV estimators will be consistent if u∗ is assumed to
be independent of both the instruments and the environmental variables zit ; environmental
variables can only help exploit the eciency improvement possibilities, but themselves can’t
open up new ones:
∂u∗
∂Instruments = 0
∂u∗
∂zit
= 0.
We believe that since the instruments are weather phenomena the rst assumption will likely
to hold. e second assumption is more restrictive. In that case, we assume that since our
framework is relatively short (5 years, see next section), it’s unlikely that the policies could
aect the potential and structure of ineciency distribution across states under such a short
timespan.
3.3 Data
Estimating (3.2) requires data about the the output (y), inputs (x ’s), and the environmental
variables (z). e cross-sectional units (i) are the U.S. states’ manufacturing sectors; the time
variable, t , goes from 2010 to 2014, annually. is short run examination implicitly excludes
most technological innovations, the focus is on managerial practices and organisational
improvements. As the environmental management literature has shown (e.g. Pes et al.,
1999; Martin et al., 2012; Park et al., 2014), managerial practices and aitudes are important
determinants of environmental-friendliness of rms.
Table 4.2 describes the summary statistics of the variables. We include three inputs: labour,
capital, and materials. e labour input data (employment in manufacturing) comes from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ State and Metropolitan Area Employment database (SAE).
Capital and material data come from the geographic area statistics of the Annual Survey of
Manufacturers (ASM). State-level data is available from 2010 to 2014. e output variable
(the manufacturing sector’s contribution to the state’s current GDP) comes from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic Accounts (REA).
e data is somewhat limited, because of the state-level aggregation, but the stochastic
frontier methodology proved to be instructive in country-level estimations (e.g. see Koop
et al., 1999; Greene, 2004).
e policy proxy comes from the American Council for an Energy-Ecient Economy. e
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Source
Contr. to current GDP ($1,000) 38,603.565 46,698.249 230 255,634 255 REA yit
Employment (1000s) 224.459 229.226 1 1,269.6 255 SAE
xitCapital expenditures ($1,000) 3,085,226.631 3,515,361.309 3,551 19,927,758 255 ASM
Material costs ($1,000) 64,146,187.671 79,914,570.273 79,169 494,603,256 255 ASM
Revised ACEEE score 9.164 4.735 0 20.875 357 ACEEE zitEnergy price ($/million Btu) 13.805 6.148 6.41 54.17 459 EIA
Avg. days with thunderstorm 1.168 0.788 0.038 4.186 252 QCLCD InstrumentsAvg. wind speed (km/h) 7.275 1.509 4.437 11.111 252 QCLCD
e yit and xit are specic for the states’ manufacturing sector.
ACEEE scores and days with thunderstorm are state-level. Energy prices are state-level industrial prices.
Years: 2010-2014 (5 years), 51 states.
American Council for Energy-Ecient Economy (ACEEE) is a nonprot organisation which
conducts analysis regularly about energy eciency in the US economy. One of its projects is
the ’State Energy Eciency scorecard’ published annually. e scorecards assign scores for
the states between 0 and 50 based on the stringency of state-level energy policy. ey include
utility, transportation, building and combined heat-and-power policies, state initiatives and
application standards; these are the main categories of evaluation. Most categories are
divided into subcategories (see Table 3.6 in the Appendix for details). e states are evaluated
in several years, which makes the ACEEE scores preferable over other state-level indices
(e.g. 24/7 Wall Street 2010 ranking, Greenopia 2011 State Sustainability Index, Forbes 2007
America’s Greenest states).4 e most recent executive summary states that: ”[a]s in the
past, this year’s report ranks states on their policy and program eorts, not only assessing
performance but also documenting best practices and recognizing leadership”, discussing
the benecial eects of ”stringent […] savings targets”, ”stringent building energy codes”
and improved compliance on the individual rankings (ACEEE, 2016). is database has been
used before in the energy policy and economics literature as a policy stringency proxy (e.g.
Murray and Mills, 2011; Yan et al., 2015).
Fig. 3.2 shows the geographical variation in 2014. As one may see, there’s a large variation
across states, Massachuses being the highest ranking state with 42 points out of the possible
50; North Dakota being the lowest with 4.
For illustrative purposes Fig. 3.3 shows the evolution of policy scores in all states. As we can
see most variation comes from across states, though dierent states have dierent trends in
their scores. We can also see large persistence of scores. In the estimations, however, we’re
only interested in the eect of the current one.
Energy prices come from the State Energy Data System of the Energy Information Admin-
istration. ey are state-level industrial prices. Manufacturing, by its size, may inuence
4Policy scores for consecutive years are available since 2008.
73
Environmental Policy and Biased Innovation
Figure 3.2: Geographical variation of the 2014 policy scores (Source: Gilleo et al., 2014).
Figure 3.3: Time variation of policy scores by states.
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Figure 3.4: Links of causality and the reasoning behind the instruments.
energy prices leading to issues of reverse causality and endogeneity; to minimise the impact
of potential endogeneity, as well as to take into account of any time lag in the response of
rms to energy prices, we estimate the eects of lagged prices.
Unfortunately the causal links between manufacturing and environmental policy are likely
to be two-way. Figure 3.4 sketches the potential links between them signs show the expected
direction of the eects. Ineciency of manufacturing is likely to increase pollution, as
inecient sectors use resource ineciently which includes the polluting inputs. e increased
pollution (be it air, ground, or water) faced by the electorate in the state increases the demand
for environmental quality and goods (e.g. clean air or water). is increased demand leads to
a stringent environmental policy. Stringent environmental policy then decreases ineciency
- according to Porter. If Figure 3.4 is accurate, then the potential endogeneity bias dampens
the Porter eect.
To address the endogeneity of the policy scores, we will use an instrumental variable approach.
Our chosen instruments are the mean number of thunderstorms and the average wind speed
in the year, in the given state. ey come from the ality Controlled Local Climatological
Data (QCLCD). We convert the daily, station-level data by averaging the observations from
stations by states. ese instruments t in the long tradition of weather instruments in
economics (e.g. Wolpin, 1982; Luechinger, 2009; Sarsons, 2015). As any weather phenomena,
thunderstorms and wind speed are unlikely to be correlated with the economic variables of
manufacturing.
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Figure 3.5: understorm’s life-cycle. Source: Ward (2016).
Yet, they could aect the states environmental and energy policy. e wind speed is an
accepted instrument by the literature; the wind blows away the pollution, aecting demand
for environmental goods and thus the stringency of environmental policy (see e.g. Luechinger,
2009). understorms work similarly to winds. During a thunderstorm-formation, the clouds
absorb all the air on the ground level, including air pollution (Dickerson et al., 1987). Fig. 3.5
provides a simple illustration of a thunderstorm’s life cycle. During the formation (”cumulus”
stage) the thunderstorm absorbs surface-level air in the updraught and during its mature
stage it starts to pump the air into higher atmospheres.
understorms and wind clean the air exogenously. If a state encounters lots of thunder-
storms and strong winds in a given year, its air automatically cleans itself, lowering the
demand for environmental goods, leading to laxer policy.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Estimates without instruments
Table 3.2 reports the results of estimations without instrumentation. e lower half shows
the estimation of the deterministic part of the model, the production function; the upper half
reports the variables in the scaling function, showing the eect on ineciency. Unlike the
coecients of a Cobb-Douglas production function, the coecients of the translog don’t
have a straightforward interpretation. Negative coecients in the rst and second order
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terms are common (Greene, 2003, Chap. 5). To help the interpretation we calculate the
observation-specic elasticities of inputs (averages are reported in Table 3.2). e elasticity
of input j at time t for state i’s manufacturing sector in a translog production function is
calculated as:
ηit ,j = βj + Σβj,k lnxit ,k + 2βjj lnxit ,j .
e average elasticities of capital (around 0.21) and labour (around 0.83) roughly correspond
to comparable estimates of the US manufacturing (e.g. Felipe and Adams, 2005; Abraham and
White, 2006; Growiec et al., 2015). e average elasticity of materials is around 0.05, thus the
implied returns to scale is around 1.08, again in line with comparable estimates (Levy, 1990).
ese estimates are remarkably stable across specications (see column (i)-(v) of Table 3.2).
Above the production function estimates are the results for the scaling function. e rst
column shows the eect of the scores on ineciency without controlling to energy prices
or time eects. e score is signicant and negative supporting the PH; it has a negative
association with ineciency. e coecient shows that if there’s (1/50=)2% increase in
stringency, ineciency decreases by 0.9%. Column (ii) shows the estimation controlling
for energy prices. Energy price changes are insignicant and negative; stringency stays
negative and signicant, supporting the PH. Column (iii) adds time eects to the estimation;
intuitively this means that the production function is allowed to shi up or down, across
periods. e coecient of the policy score stays signicant and stable at -0.009, as are the
input elasticities. is seems to support our assumption of stable production function (time
eects are insignicant) and the focus on managerial practices. Column (iv) and (v) shows
the estimation with lagged policy scores. e coecients are statistically signicant. e
strong association between stringency and ineciency is likely to show the importance
of the choice of stringency proxy. In the next section we only rely on the causal eect of
the current score, which according to Figure 3.4 would have a larger negative eect on
ineciency.
3.4.2 IV estimates
Table 3.4 reports the rst stage results, and as expected the instruments are strong and they
have a negative impact on policy scores (i.e. the more thunderstorms there are, the policy
makers are less under pressure to implement stringent policies).
Table 3.3 reports the results of the IV estimations. e production function has similar
coecient to the ones in Table 3.2. e elasticity of capital stays roughly the same as before,
whereas the elasticity of labour seems to decrease a bit, while elasticity of materials increases.
Some of the inputs lose statistical signicance, to be expected by the increased variance of
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Table 3.2: Results of the naive estimations (without instrumentation).
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Scaling function [Ineciency]
Policy scoret -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Policy scoret−1 -0.009∗∗∗
(0.003)
Policy scoret−2 -0.010∗∗∗
(0.003)
∆ Energy pricet−1 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
∆ Energy pricet−2 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
∆ Energy pricet−3 -0.006 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ln(Value addedt ) [Production frontier]
ln(Capitalt ) -4.067∗∗∗ -3.900∗∗∗ -3.790∗∗∗ -3.841∗∗∗ -3.670∗∗∗
(1.217) (1.251) (1.271) (1.272) (1.268)
ln(Materialst ) -5.537∗∗∗ -5.741∗∗∗ -5.870∗∗∗ -5.851∗∗∗ -5.833∗∗∗
(1.042) (1.116) (1.148) (1.151) (1.139)
ln(Employmentt ) 10.123∗∗∗ 10.131∗∗∗ 10.112∗∗∗ 10.165∗∗∗ 9.951∗∗∗
(1.492) (1.511) (1.541) (1.540) (1.531)[
ln(Capitalt )
]2 0.093 0.090 0.081 0.096 0.088
(0.074) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076)[
ln(Employmentt )
]2 0.425∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078)
[ln(Materialst )]2 0.147∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.165∗∗
(0.066) (0.070) (0.072) (0.071) (0.070)
ln(Capitalt )×ln(Employmentt ) -0.363∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.123) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124)
ln(Capitalt )×ln(Materialst ) 0.195∗ 0.188∗ 0.193∗ 0.176 0.174
(0.110) (0.113) (0.115) (0.114) (0.113)
ln(Employmentt )×ln(Materialst ) -0.475∗∗∗ -0.482∗∗∗ -0.488∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗ -0.477∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.098)
Intercept 59.106∗∗∗ 59.673∗∗∗ 60.049∗∗∗ 60.160∗∗∗ 59.251∗∗∗
(7.509) (7.715) (7.873) (7.879) (7.824)
Avg. elasticity of capital 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21
Avg. elasticity of labour 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.83
Avg. elasticity of materials 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
Time eects No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 255 255 255 255 255∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. N = 51, T = 5.
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the IV estimator. e rows at the boom show the standard IV tests. e Sargan-Hansen test
for overidentifying restrictions shows that wind speed and thunderstorms are uncorrelated
with the error term in the second stage, while the weak identication test shows that they
have a strong eect on the energy policy of the state. ese are true for all specications.
Column (i) shows the estimation only with the policy stringency. e estimation strongly
supports the Porter hypothesis: the coecient is negative and signicant on 5%. Its magnitude
is larger; shows that 2% increase in stringency (a 1 point increase on the 0-50 point scale)
leads to 1.4% decrease in ineciency. Assuming a linear eect this translates to an elasticity
of -0.7. e result seems to support the relations outlined in Figure 3.4: the endogeneity
hinders the observation the Porter eect.
Column (ii) shows the addition of energy prices. Like before, energy prices are insignicant,
but the score is signicantly negative. Column (iii) is the preferred specication: it controls
for time eects, energy prices and endogeneity. It shows a strong negative eect; as in
column (i) the eect shows (1/50=)2% increase in stringency decreases ineciency by 1.4%.
If we assume that the policy scores are linear in stringency, and linear response by the sector,
this would show a -0.7 elasticity of ineciency with respect to stringency. e following
columns show robustness checks.
e rst robustness checks address the policy scores (appendix with details available on
request). I compose alternative scores, which exclude all categories that aren’t evaluated
every year, and categories which weights change are reweighed with the 2014 weights;
intuitively this suggests that ACEEE knows the stringency of categories evaluated in all
years, but the inclusion of new categories and changing weights disrupt the evaluation.
Column (iv) shows the estimation with this new score composition. e coecient changes
to -0.033; it still supports the PH. Under the conditions outlined in the previous paragraph,
this would translate to -0.79 elasticity; close to the estimation with the unaltered scores.
Column (v) takes a step further. Not only new categories are excluded, but all other categories
which weight change across time. is assumes that categories which are dierently weighted
are incomparable. Again, the signicantly negative coecient supports the PH. It implies a
-0.76 elasticity; close to the elasticity of the preferred specication.
Finally, column (vi) shows the robustness in controlling for state-level heterogeneity, by
Mundlak transformation (Mundlak, 1978). is is a standard way to control for heterogeneity
in stochastic frontier studies (see Farsi et al., 2005). Mundlak transformation essentially con-
trols for state-level heterogeneity by including cross sectional averages of the inputs.5 Since
5In a stochastic frontier model this would be lnyit = α + Σβj lnxit, j + ΣΣβjk lnxit, j lnxit,k +ai −uit +vit ,
where ai is the heterogeneity assumed to be ai = Σ ln x¯i, j + ΣΣγjk ln x¯i, j x¯i,k . Mundlak (1978) showed that
βs can be interpreted as the ’between’ estimator, while the γ ’s show the dierence between the ’within’ and
’between’ estimator. For that reasons those coecients don’t have a straightforward interpretation. erefore
they’re usually omied from the discussions.
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the timeframe is short most inputs lose statistical signicance, but score is still signicant
(though only on 10%) and negative. e coecient is smaller (in absolute terms), though the
dierence is insignicant. e implied elasticity is -0.5, again relatively close to the elasticity
of the preferred specication.
3.5 Conclusion
e eect of endogeneity is quite large: about 35% of the eect is unobserved in the non-
instrumented estimations. In the instrumented estimations not only support the PH strongly,
but the implied elasticity is stable across specications around -0.7 and -0.8. An increase in
stringency decreases ineciency by 0.7%.
How can this happen? Out of the possible mechanisms listed by Porter and Van der Linde
(1995) the highlighting of resource ineciency seems to be the most natural explanation in
our case. Stringency might also raise corporate awareness, but that would be unlikely to
show up in a stochastic frontier estimation, unless it also indicates ineciencies.
With environmental policy sparking heated debates, decision makers make statements oen
implicitly assessing the validity of the Porter hypothesis. Is there a trade-o between eco-
nomic performance and stringent environmental policy? Most research on PH to date proxied
environmental policy with abatement costs and found lile evidence for it. e present paper,
on the other hand, contributes to the newly emerging literature using alternative proxies,
and controls for the potential endogeneity of environmental policy. e estimation strongly
supports the Porter hypothesis: policy stringency enhances competitive advantage. e
result is robust to alternative score composition, the inclusion of time eects, energy prices,
addressing heterogeneity and endogeneity. e eect is smaller in the non-instrumented
estimations. is and the new proxy might explain the negative ndings of previous investi-
gations. It also shows that in conventional estimations, the negative eects of environmental
policies are likely to exaggerated. is could serve as an important caveat for policy makers,
when estimating the eect of a future environmental policy on competitive industries.
80
Environmental Policy and Biased Innovation
Table 3.3: Results of the IV estimations.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Scaling function [Ineciency]
Instrumented Policy scoret -0.014∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.038∗ -0.010∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.017) (0.006)
∆ Energy pricet−1 -0.005 -0.010 -0.011 -0.008 -0.006
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.027) (0.014)
∆ Energy pricet−2 -0.006 -0.011 -0.014 -0.011 -0.008
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.026) (0.011)
∆ Energy pricet−3 -0.005 -0.010 -0.014 -0.010 -0.004
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.013)
ln(Value added)t [Production frontier]
ln(Capitalt ) -1.759 -1.596 -1.403 -1.449 -1.734 -0.882
(2.670) (2.954) (3.053) (2.783) (2.746) (3.072)
ln(Materialst ) -5.900∗∗∗ -6.163∗∗∗ -6.315∗∗∗ -6.576∗∗∗ -6.297∗∗∗ -6.109
(1.634) (1.768) (1.840) (1.701) (1.794) (4.001)
ln(Employmentt ) 8.318∗∗∗ 8.404∗∗∗ 8.321∗∗∗ 8.768∗∗∗ 8.717∗∗∗ 6.341∗
(1.936) (2.088) (2.133) (1.941) (2.044) (3.405)[
ln(Capitalt )
]2 0.023 0.022 0.012 0.022 0.016 -0.056
(0.119) (0.128) (0.138) (0.133) (0.150) (0.172)[
ln(Employmentt )
]2 0.345∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.237
(0.088) (0.096) (0.100) (0.091) (0.096) (0.222)
[ln(Materialst )]2 0.179 0.193 0.197 0.212∗ 0.189 0.165
(0.119) (0.126) (0.127) (0.118) (0.123) (0.178)
ln(Capitalt )×ln(Employmentt ) -0.218 -0.212 -0.194 -0.213 -0.229 -0.045
(0.202) (0.226) (0.242) (0.221) (0.236) (0.286)
ln(Capitalt )×ln(Materialst ) 0.138 0.128 0.129 0.119 0.150 0.156
(0.217) (0.212) (0.212) (0.208) (0.225) (0.237)
ln(Employmentt )×ln(Materialst ) -0.450∗∗∗ -0.461∗∗∗ -0.467∗∗∗ -0.492∗∗∗ -0.474∗∗∗ -0.420∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.115) (0.121) (0.121) (0.143) (0.128)
Intercept 49.728∗∗∗ 50.675∗∗∗ 50.795∗∗∗ 52.481∗∗∗ 52.108∗∗∗ 42.702∗∗∗
(11.914) (12.847) (13.203) (11.484) (11.693) (12.070)
Avg. elasticity of capital 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.21 -
Avg. elasticity of labour 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.78 0.78 -
Avg. elasticity of materials 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 -
Sargan-Hansen test for over-id. 0.73 0.66 0.66 0.97 1.15 1.64
(0.39) (0.42) (0.42) (0.32) (0.28) (0.20)
Weak identication test 58.84 61.35 62.33 39.04 37.54 53.77
(0.01>)∗∗∗ (0.01>)∗∗∗ (0.01>)∗∗∗ (0.01>)∗∗∗ (0.01>)∗∗∗ (0.01>)∗∗∗
Time eects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak transformation No No No No No Yes
Number of observations 255 255 255 255 255 255
∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. N = 51 (states), T = 5 (years) . Instruments: avg. windspeed, avg. number of thunderstorms.
Column (i)-(iv) are estimations with the unaltered scores, columns (iv)-(v) use alternative score compositions.
Column (vi) uses the unaltered scores with Mundlak transformation.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Other results
Table 3.4: First stage estimation (Dep. var: Raw policy scores).
Excluded instruments
understorms -6.741 ∗∗∗
(0.670)
Avg. wind speed -0.524 ∗
(0.313)
Included instruments
ln(Capital) -152.411 ∗∗∗
(41.880)
ln(Employment) 161.607 ∗∗∗
(42.766)
[ln(Capital)]2 9.590 ∗∗∗
(2.354)
[ln(Employment)]2 8.643 ∗∗∗
(2.207)
ln(Capital)×ln(Employment) -15.128 ∗∗∗
(3.872)
ln(Materials) -217.529∗∗∗
(32.772)
[ln(Materials)]2 1.102
(1.288)
ln(Employment)×ln(Materials) -0.811
(1.707)
ln(Capital)×ln(Materials) -2.964
(3.478)
∆Energy pricet−1 -0.226
(0.239)
∆Energy pricet−2 -0.736 ∗∗∗
(0.236)
∆Energy pricet−3 -0.299
(0.203)
Intercept 780.964 ∗∗∗
(201.815)
Number of obs. 255
∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. N = 51 (states), T = 5 (years).
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ACEEE scores
We start from the premise that the sta of ACEEE are experts: the scores as they are, reect
regulation stringency. A relaxation of this assumption would exclude all the categories
which aren’t evaluated in all years (denoted by dash [-] in Table 3.6) and categories which
are evaluated and count toward a nal score, but to an unknown extent are denoted with an
asterisk [*]). Table 3.6 shows the scoring in detail for each year. e dash (-) denotes that
the subcategory isn’t measured, while the asterisk (*) denotes that it is assessed and counts
toward the nal score, with an unknown weight. To bridge the problem, I only include
categories and subcategories which are scored in all years.
Furthermore one might argue that the changing weighs in the scoring also biases the
results. To address this problem I reweigh all scores with 2014 weights. Table 3.7 reports the
correlation between three compositions:
• raw scores,
• revised scores without any reweighing, and
• revised scores with reweighing.
e idea behind leaving the weights intact is that the criteria for stringent regulation may be
changing across periods, and the changing weights maybe simply reect this fact.
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Table 3.5: Hausman test for endogeneity (for the preferred specication).
F -value 3.67
p-value 0.058
Table 3.6: Changes in ACEEE score weights and categories.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Utility and public benets
programs and policies 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Spending/Budget for Electricity
eciency 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Spending/Budget for Nat. Gas eciency 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
Savings from Electricity 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Savings from Natural gas - - - - - 1 2
Opt-out policies - - - - - - 0
Energy Eciency Resource Standards 4 4 4 4 4 3 3
Incentives and removal of disincentives 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Transportation policies 6 5 8 9 9 9 9
GHG standards 2 * * 2 2 2 1.5
Smart growth policies 1 - - - - - -
Hybrid and electric vehicle incentives 1 - - - - - -
Electric vehicle registrations - - - - - - 0.5
Integration of transportation and land
use - - - 2 2 2 1
Freight plans - - - - - - 1
Targets to reduce vehicle miles travelled - * * 2 2 2 1
Change in vehicle miles travelled - - - - - 1
Transit funding 1 * * 1 1 1 1
Transit legislation - - - - 1 1 0.5
Complete streets policies - - - 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
High-eciency veh. incentives 1 * * 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
Building energy codes 8 7 7 7 7 7 7
Stringency 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Enforcement 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
Combined heat and power 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Interconnection standard * * * * 1 1 1
Treatment under renewable portfolio
standard (RPS) - - - - - - 0.5
Treatment under energy
eciency resource standard (EERS) - - - - - - 1
Treatment under EERS/RPS * * * * 1 1 -
Revenue streams - - - - - - 0.5
Net metering - - * * 0.5 0.5 -
Incentives and grants * * * * 1 1 0.5
Financing assistance - - - - 0.5 0.5 0.5
Standby rates * * * * - - -
Additional policy support - - - - 0.5 0.5 0.5
Emissions treatment * * * * 0.5 0.5 0.5
State government initiatives - 7 7 7 7 7 7
Financial incentives 3 3 3 3 3 2.5 2.5
Energy disclosure policies - - - - 1 1
Lead-by-example eorts in state
facilities and eets 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Research and development 2 2 2 2 2 1.5 1.5
Appliance and equipment
eciency standards 4 3 3 2 2 2 2
Table 3.7: Cross-correlation table.
Variables Raw scores Revised scoreswith reweighing Completely revised scores
Raw scores 1.000
Revised scores
with reweighing 0.847 1.000
Completely
revised scores 0.946 0.910 1.000
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Chapter 4
Climate policy and the eciency of
rms: New Evidence from UK
manufacturing
Abstract:1e present paper presents a new empirical investigation into the Porter hypothe-
sis; it tests whether climate policy – in the form of the UK Climate Change Levy – enhances
rms’ eciency. Taking advantage of the variation introduced by the design features of the
Climate Change Levy, we use British rm-level data to investigate this question within a
Stochastic Frontier Analysis framework. Our results show that the Climate Change Levy
had a signicant positive impact on rm’s eciency in four large manufacturing sectors.2
4.1 Introduction
While President Trump’s description of the Paris Climate Agreement as “totally disastrous,
job-killing, wealth-knocking out” at the Conservative Political Action Conference in February
2018 might have been characteristically antagonistic, there is lile doubt that environmental
policies are consistently linked in certain circles with increased costs for businesses and
1is chapter is based on joint work with Dr. Corrado Di Maria.
2is work contains statistical data from the Oce of National Statistics which is Crown copyright and
reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the eens Printer for Scotland. e UK Data
Service agrees that the aached outputs are non-disclosive, and cannot be used to identify a person or organisa-
tion. e original data creators, depositors or copyright holders, the funders of the Data Collections (if dierent)
and the UK Data Service at the UK Data Archive bear no responsibility for the further analysis or interpretation
of the data. is work uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates.
A full replication archive can be accessed through the UK Data Service, with their permission. To learn more,
go to ://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/get-data/how-to-access/accesssecurelab.
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growth slowdowns. In other words, the suggestion seems to be that there exists an inescapable
trade-o between businesses’ competitiveness and environmental protection.
A starkly contrasting view has been put forward by Michael Porter, who famously suggested
that such a link need not be inevitable (Porter, 1991). In fact, Porter (1991) stated that “[s]trict
environmental regulations do not inevitably hinder competitive advantage against rivals;
indeed they oen enhance it” (Porter, 1991, p. 108). Porter’s simple, if counter-intuitive,
idea that, when prodded by environmental regulations, rms would nd creative ways
to restructure their operations – gaining competitive advantages over their unregulated
counterparts in the process – has come to be known as the Porter Hypothesis (henceforth,
PH for short).
Porter and Van der Linde (1995) expand on Porter’s original intuition suggesting several
channels through which the PH might arise. Crucially, they argue that since “the world does
not t the Panglossian belief that rms always make optimal choices” (Porter and Van der
Linde, 1995, p. 99), there are ample opportunities for rms to make eciency gains under
the push of environmental regulations.3
In this paper, we concentrate on this aspect of the PH and investigate whether or not
businesses are able to pick the ‘low-hanging fruit’ that can be found in their organization, if
any. To do this, we need to focus on detailed rm-level data and on the short run reactions
of rms to the introduction of (suciently stringent) regulation. Porter and Van der Linde’s
view summarized above, moreover, grates with the neoclassical tradition that views rms
operating under the strict discipline of the market as intrinsically ecient, as thus also
requires a methodological deviation from the mainstream to address. In what follows,
we cast our analysis of the consequences of environmental regulation within a Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA) framework that relaxes the assumption that rms operate on the
ecient frontier, thus creating room for potential production ineciencies (e.g. Kumbhakar
and Lovell, 2000). is method openly allows for the the possibility that inecient rms
coexist on the market with much more ecient competitors and is, in our view, the ideal
methodological complement to Porter and Van der Linde’s world view.4
In what follows, we use the variation caused by the design features of the 2000 Climate
Change Levy (CCL) package to identify the impact of the introduction of the levy on treated
rms. We do this by using condential British rm-level manufacturing data, made available
via the UK Data Service, which contains detailed information on rm performance and
3Ambec et al. (2013) provide an interesting introduction to the Porter Hypothesis, along with an overview
of the rich literature that discusses it.
4is framework is also consistent with the empirical evidence suggesting the existence of staggering that
total factor productivity (TFP) dierences across manufacturing rms. Syverson (2011b), for example, reports
that the average TFP ratio between the 10th and the 90th percentile plants in U.S. four digits manufacturing
plants is 1.92.
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productive inputs, as well as energy use by fuel type. We are able to estimate the impact of
the CCL on rms across four large manufacturing sectors: ‘Food Products and Beverages’
(SIC-15), ‘Basic Metals’ (SIC-27), ‘Fabricated Metal Products’ (SIC-28), and ‘Machinery and
Equipment’ (SIC-29). We estimate the aggregate impact at the level of each industry, and
then discuss dierential impacts over time and across subsets of rms with dierent energy
intensity, as a proxy for the intensity of the treatment. Our results show that the CCL had a
signicant negative impact on ineciency across all of the industries, with more nuanced
results when looking at the time prole and the energy-intensity split.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to address the PH in the context of climate
change regulation using a SFA framework. In this sense, our paper contributes to the
literature on the PH in at least two ways. First of all, we are the rst to use British rm-level
manufacturing data across a number of two-digit industries, and thus contribute both to
painting the aggregate picture and to lling in the more granular, sectoral detail. Secondly,
we showcase a methodology which not only matches the theoretical underpinnings of the
PH, but it also allows us to estimate the impact of CCL on rms’ ineciency without having
to formulate distributional assumptions. We nd this a very appealing property of our
methodology. More broadly, our work contributes to the vast literature on the impact of
market-based environmental regulation on rms, and thus complements eorts by other by
oering variation in both methodology, geographical coverage and sectoral breakdown.
Following Jae and Palmer (1997a), it has become customary in the PH literature to distin-
guish three variants of the PH: the narrow, the weak, and the strong variant. Each variant
has a somewhat dierent avour and focuses on dierent outcomes. e narrow strand, for
example, focuses on the cost of adjusting to changes in regulatory stringency, e.g. Butraw
(2000); Driesen (2005). e weak strand, instead, limits itself to examining the eect of
regulations on the innovative activities undertaken by rms, usually with a focus on R&D
expenditures and patenting (e.g. Brunneimer and Cohen, 2003; Popp, 2006). Finally, the
strong strand of this literature tries to be more comprehensive and examines the regulations’
eect on business competitiveness. In so far as we concentrate in estimating improvements
in eciency recorded across rms, we share our focus with the strong PH literature. While
we are broadly agnostic at this stage about the mechanisms behind the eciency gains, it is
clear that some type of change in practices occurs to bring them about. In this sense, our
paper is also related to the weak PH literature, albeit with a somewhat broader understanding
of the meaning innovation than found elsewhere in the literature. In the interest of brevity,
however, in what follows we mostly refer to the literature that directly maps regulatory
stringency and rm’s competitiveness.
In an early contribution, Barbera and McConnell (1990) nd that abatement costs are associ-
ated with lower TFP growth in American pollution intensive industries during the period
1960-1980. Alpay et al. (2002) nd negligible and negative eects on productivity growth in
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the U.S. food industry, but positive eects in the Mexican counterpart. ey proxy regulation
stringency using abatement costs in the U.S., but with inspection frequency in Mexico. Gray
(1987) examines U.S. manufacturing, nd that abatement costs are associated with lower pro-
ductivity growth. (Gray and Shadbegian, 2003) nd similar, negative eect on the U.S. paper
mills. Berman and Bui (2001) nd a strong positive eect of abatement costs on productivity
in the oil reneries in the Los Angeles area. Staying in North America, Dufour et al. (1998)
nd negative eect of abatement costs on the TFP growth rate in e´bec manufacturing.
Bo¨hringer et al. (2012) nd that in German manufacturing rms, environmental investment
tend to enhance productivity growth, but energy and environmental expenditure doesn’t.
e studies above all use static estimations. e Porter hypothesis, however, suggests a
dynamic framework, as the full eects of the regulatory tightening take time to display
as both innovation and market adjustments take time. Several studies conrm that the
inclusion of dynamic aspects has considerable impact from the empirical point of view:
Lanoie et al. (2008), like Dufour et al. (1998) before them, examine e´bec manufacturing
using abatement costs as their stringency proxy. ey also include lagged abatement costs
in the estimation, however, and nd a signicant positive eect on TFP growth, reverting
the previous conclusions.
Only a handful of other studies have brought dynamic estimations to bear on the PH question,
with mixed results. Managi et al. (2005) apply data envelopment analysis to oil and gas
production data in the Gulf of Mexico. ey nd negative eect of abatement costs on both
productivity and technical change. Broberg et al. (2013) use Swedish manufacturing data in
a dynamic stochastic frontier model. ey use pollution prevention and pollution control
investment as stringency proxies and nd no evidence in support of the PH. Rubashkina
et al. (2015) examine European rms with a xed eect regression using abatement costs as
a proxy for stringency and nd no evidence in favour of the PH. e laer authors are – to
our knowldege – the only ones to have aempted to correct for the endogeneity of policies
in their work.
e studies above have all used abatement costs or closely related measures as their proxy
for the stringency of environmental regulation, albeit usually with a caveat. Berman and
Bui (2001), for example, write that “abatement costs may severely overstate the true cost of
environmental regulation”, because abatement technologies may increase productivity, so a
rm could invest in abatement technologies even without the added incentive introduced
by the environmental regulation – making abatement costs at least partially endogenous
(Berman and Bui, 2001, p. 509). Ambec et al. (2013) argue that large abatement costs may
be caused by a number of factors other than policy, for example by the vintage of the
installed capacity, or changes in energy prices. Besides, they also point out that the PH “does
not posit that higher abatement costs will lead to innovation” (Ambec et al., 2013, p. 14).
Similarly, Broberg et al. (2013) argue that “environmental investment will […] not correctly
88
Environmental Policy and Biased Innovation
reect regulation stringency”, because rms may wish to improve their green credentials
by environmental investments, if they thought this might help them increase their market
appeal (Broberg et al., 2013, p. 53). ey also add that the use of survey questions may lead
to inconsistent data, as dierent rms categorise their environmental investment in dierent
ways.
Dynamic studies using dierent proxies paint a more nuanced picture. Leeuwen and Mohnen
(2013), for example, nd no eect of energy price on TFP in the Netherlands. Taking
an international perspective, Lanoie et al. (2011) use a seven-country OECD survey to
estimate the eects of perceived environmental stringency on business performance. ey
nd a positive correlation between the two. Greenstone et al. (2012) nd positive eect
of CO regulations on plant-level TFP, but negative eect from regulations of every other
pollutant. eir approach is to proxy regulatory stringency by the non-aainment status of
plants/counties. Earnhart and Rassier (2016) apply a special index to examine the eect of
regulations on return to sales in the US. eir results show that, if monitoring is tight the
PH does not hold. If it’s not tight, the PH holds. Finally, Henderson and Millimet (2005) nd
that, at the state-level, the elasticity of output with respect to relative abatement costs is
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
e rest of the paper is structured as follows, we rst introduce the institutional context and
discuss the key design features of the CCL package (Section 4.2). Section 4.3 then introduces
the methodology and discusses the key econometric challenges. In Section 4.4 we discuss
the data, followed by the results in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 summarizes the main
insights and concludes with possible directions for further research.
4.2 e UK Climate Change Levy
e 2008 Climate Change Bill forces the UK to reduce its carbon emissions by 50% until 2050.
Achieving this ambitious goal requires strong economic incentives, likely to be provided
by stringent environmental policies. e Climate Change Levy considered as one of the
agship policies, one of the main tools for country-wide reduction of carbon emissions (HM
Government, 2006) .
e CCL is a per unit energy tax on non-domestic energy consumption, which came into
eect in 2001. Table 4.1 shows that there are dierent tax rates for dierent the fuels. ough
the CCL was presented as a carbon tax (certain fuels were exempt because of their low
carbon content), the third column of Table 4.1 shows that depending on the fuel, the implicit
carbon tax varies widely. For this reason Martin et al. (2014) argues that it’s misleading to
think of the CCL as a carbon tax, but it should be considered as a tax reecting dierent
nancial and political goals.
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e UK government aimed to counteract the possible adverse eects on competitiveness, so it
made possible to get a 80% discount of the CCL by negiotiating a Climate Change Agreement
(CCA). In the Climate Change Agreements the sector associations and the government setup
a sector-wide and facility specic targets for energy use or carbon emission reductions. To
be eligible a plant needs to be in an energy intensive industry and carry out at least one
”qualifying activity” (the sector-specic qualifying activities are listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1
of the Pollution Prevention and Control Regulations 2000).
Martin et al. (2014) argues that targets of the CCAs weren’t binding. First, there was a large
overcompliance with the CCA targets. By the end of the rst compliance period in 2002
almost twice of the initial targets were achieved: 4.5 MtC instead of 2.2 MtC.
Second, if the sectors as a whole met its agreed target, the individual facilities didn’t have to
comply to get the reduced rate in the next compliance period. is also lowers the incentives
of sticking to the CCA targets. ird, there was large degree of exibility renegiotating the
agreements. Sectors could choose their baseline given the targets by the government. CCA
targets could be revised and adjusted to various ’relevant constraints’. Hence it seems unlikely
that CCAs were stringent and binding agreements, thus in eect, the rms participating
in CCAs could be viewed as the ”non-treated” group. Since selected rms could opt out
from the ’treated’ to the ’non-treated’ group, we could think of the treatment as partially
endogenous. To solve this ’endogenous switching’ problem we use Heckman’s (1979) model,
and since the estimation is done separately for ’treated’ and the ’non-treated’, we could think
of this problem as sample selection (see next section).
ere were few evaluations of the CCL package. Ekins and Etheridge (2006) use a compu-
tational model to estimate the impact of CCAs on the energy consumption of rms. ey
found decrease CCA rms and argue that this is because CCA raised corporate awareness
and disseminated the relevant information. Barker et al. (2007) use the same computational
model designed by Cambridge Econometrics and nd a large, 9.1%, average decrease in the
manufacturing sector’s energy use in the UK. e whole energy consumption declines by
2.6% and there’s a slight increase of economic competitiveness as a result. Martin et al. (2014)
were the rst to estimate the eect of the CCL package with microdata. ey used an IV
approach to look at the economic and environmental eects of the CCL. eir instrument
was the rms status (listed/not listed) in the European Pollution Emission Registry, argu-
ing a listed status indicates a larger exposure to international environmental policies and
competition. ey nd that CCL signicantly reduced energy intensity by around 20% and
electricity consumption by 7%, but no eect on revenues, employment or plant exit.
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Table 4.1: Summary of the Climate Change Levy as a taxation
Unit tax (p/kWh) Tax rate (%) Implicit carbon tax (£/t)
Natural gas 0.15 16.5 30
Coal 0.15 6.1 16
Electricity 0.43 10.1 31
LPG 0.07 8.2 22
Source: Martin et al. (2014), Pearce (2006).
4.3 A stochastic frontier model with sample selection
As mentioned in the Introduction, thanks to its focus on allowing and explaining ineciencies
in production and business management, stochastic frontier methods can be seen as an ideal
empirical counterpart for the theoretical views suggested by the PH literature. In this section,
we put forward an empirical model that will allow us to test, in the remainder of the paper,
the idea that the introduction of environmental regulation may increase rms’ eciency.
Given the specic design features of the UK CCL, in what follows we describe a Stochastic
Frontier model with sample selection a´ la Wang and Schmidt (2002) and Alvarez et al. (2006),
which allows us to capture the fact that we only observe ‘treated’ rms if they pay the
full tax. Consider a panel of N rms indexed by i = 1, . . . ,N , observed over t = 1, . . . ,T
consecutive periods of time. Let yit be the (log of the) outcome variable of interest – the
log of turnover in our empirical investigation – and xit a vector of factors (in logs) that
determine the position of the frontier. Furthermore, let zit be a vector of variables that aect
the magnitude of technical ineciency. Generally speaking, the xit are productive inputs,
whereas zit may either be themselves inputs, or ‘environmental variables’ that measure the
state of the environment the rm operates in. Moreover, since we assume that the xit and
the zit are xed, they cannot be functions of yit .
Let y∗it ≥ yit be the unobserved frontier. e linear stochastic frontier model asserts that,
conditional on xit and zit , the observations on the frontier are distributed according to
N (x′itβ,σ 2v ). It follows that the frontier can be wrien as
y∗it = x
′
itβ +vit , (4.1)
where vit ∼ N (0,σ 2v ), and is independent of xit and zit . e model further assumes that
(conditional on xit , zit , and y∗it ) the actual output level yit equals y∗it minus a one-sided error
whose distribution only depends on the zit . It follows that we can write the model as
yit = x′itβ +vit − uit (zit ,δ). (4.2)
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We require that uit and vit be independent of each other and of xit , and, additionally, that vit
be independent of xit . Following Wang and Schmidt (2002), we say that the model exhibits
the scaling property, if
uit (zit ,δ) = h(zit ,δ) · u∗it ,
where h(zit ,δ) ≥ 0, andu∗it ≥ 0 has a distribution that does not depend on zit . In the language
of Wang and Schmidt (2002), h(zit ,δ ) is called the scaling function, u∗it is the basic random
variable, and the distribution of the laer is called the basic distribution.5
To the best of our knowledge, the use of the scaling property in SF models was rst suggested
by Simar et al. (1994a), who also pointed to some of the appealing features of the method.
Perhaps the most interesting one from our point of view is the fact that the shape of the
distribution of the ineciency term is the same for all rms; the scaling factor “essentially
just stretches or shrinks the horizontal axis, so that the scale of the distribution of u changes,
but its underlying shape does not”, in the words of Wang and Schmidt (2002). Intuitively, this
is similar to assuming that the basic random variable u∗ captures things like the managers’
natural skills, whose realization at the rm’s level comes from a random draw from the
(common) distribution of skills. How well these skills are subsequently put to good use and
result in the ecient management of the rm depends on other variables, that might refer to
the manager’s education or experience, or on measures of the environment in which the
rm operates, including the degree of competition or the stringency of the environmental
regulation, for example.
Assuming the frontier to be Cobb-Douglas and the scaling function to take the simple,
exponential form:
h(zit ,δ) = exp(z′itδ) · u∗it ,
in the rest of the paper, we estimate the following stochastic frontier model with exponential
scaling:
yit = x′itβ + ξt +vit − exp(z′itδ) · u∗it . (4.3)
In the expression above, the ξ ’s capture the inuence of Hicks neutral technical change over
time. β and δ are the parameters to be estimated. Following Alvarez et al. (2006); Wang and
Schmidt (2002) chose the exponential function as our scaling function.
Given the discussion in Section 4.2 above, our empirical seing provides a fundamental
econometric challenge: to estimate the impact of the CCL on the treated rms, we need to
take into account that same plants – namely those who are eligible to enter into a CCA with
the regulating agency – may decide to opt out of the treatment group and face a reduced
tax rate. In other words, we face a non-random assignment to the treatment group. In this
5See wang2002one and alvarez2006interpreting for thorough discussions of the estimation issues arising
from the model and possible interpretations.
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situation, it is well known that aempting to estimate the eect of the treatment on the
treated leads to biased estimates (Heckman, 1976, 1979).
Our econometric approach to correct for this potential bias follows Greene’s (2010) and
Lai’s (2015) contributions, that extend the seminal work by heckman1976common, heck-
man1979sample to stochastic frontier models.
Greene (2010) shows that the standard Heckman’s (1979) approach would not work in a
SFA context. Heckman (1979) suggests that, to correct for the selection bias, one can try to
control for the ‘latent variables’ that determine the selection decision. In practice, this entails
estimating a two step procedure, whereby an auxiliary (probit) regression is estimated to
explain the the probability that rms selected themselves into one group rather than the
other. Using the estimated coecients from the auxiliary regression, the ed inverse Mills
ratios are computed for each observation and may be included in an augmented regression
model. Heckman (1979) shows that this procedure corrects the bias.
Greene (2010), however, has shown that this is unsuitable for SFA models, due to their
non-linearity. Intuitively, since the inverse Mills ratio arises as a consequence of the linearity
of the model, correcting with it in a non-linear model is inappropriate. Lai (2015) extends
Greene (2010) to switching models and truncated normally distributed ineciency. Lai
(2015) further shows that a straightforward maximization could be unfeasible in empirical
research, so he proposes an alternative two step procedure: in the rst step, one estimates a
probit model for the switching variable, similar to the one suggested by Heckman (1979);
in the second stage, the ed values of the regression are then included in an (augmented)
frontier estimation. Aer again applying an appropriate correction to the estimation of the
standard errors to account for the ed nature of the additional regressors, the coecients
are unbiased and the (corrected) standard errors may be used for inference (e.g. Murphy and
Topel, 1985).
4.4 Data
To estimate (4.2) one needs data about the inputs (xit ), output (yit ) and the environmental
variable (zit ). e cross-sectional units are British rm in the production sector and t goes
from 1998 to 2004.
e output is the annual turnover of rms, three inputs - employment, energy and materials,
which - are from Annual Respondents Database (ARD). Capital stock comes from the Capital
Stock Database, derived from the ARD. e ARD is a rich, rm-level data, which contains
more than 10,000 rms, from 1973 to 2008.
e ARD is matched with the arterly Fuel Inquiry (QFI). e QFI is quarterly survey that
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contains rm-level data about the energy prices and energy consumption for several energy
sources. It also has detailed information about the rms’ Climate Change Levy payment
(including whether or not they participate in a CCA). Since ARD and QFI contain the same
sampling frame, it’s relatively easy to match them following Martin (2006); Martin et al.
(2014); Barnes and Martin (2002). Similarly to Martin et al. (2014), we annualise QFI by taking
the yearly averages.
We restrict our sample to rms participating in four manufacturing industries: Food products
(SIC 15), Basic metal (SIC 27), Fabricated metals (SIC 28), and Machinery and equipment
(SIC 29). By focusing on individual industries we can credibly estimate a single production
function, under which rms operate. is also helps the assumption of a common potential
for eciency.
Finally, to control for the endogenous switching bias in the Climate Change Levy (measured
by taking part in Climate Change Agreements), we use the CO2 intensity (calculated from
the energy use) and energy intensity to determine the switching to reduced CCL rate, since
for the discount a rm has to fulll the binding targets of these. Notice that the energy
intensity is a ratio (and not Btu/£); this is because the energy intensity target is given in
terms of energy costs, not energy use.
Table 4.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
log(Turnover) 10.1191 1.3355 2,341
log(Employment) 5.4617 0.9697 2,341
log(Real capital stock) 9.7860 1.3424 1,711
log(Energy) 16.0699 1.7906 2,341
Climate Change Levy (dummy) 0.7104 0.4536 2,341
Climate Change Agreement (dummy) 0.0748 0.2630 2,341
CO2 intensity 4.8370 47.0345 2,341
Energy intensity 0.0002 0.0044 2,341
4.5 Results
Table 4.3 shows the eect of CCL for the four chosen sectors. e top part shows the eects
on ineciency, the boom part shows the coecients of the production function. In all the
sectors CCL decreased ineciency signicantly, though there is variation in the size of the
eect. e coecients are large in terms of marginal eect on eciency. For example in the
Food sector (SIC 15) and the Basic metal sector (SIC 27) the eect exp(−2)− 1 = −86% change
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in ineciency. is large eect could be explained by strong competition (low ineciency)
in these sectors, so even a small improvement entails a large decrease in relative ineciency.
To see what is the actual ”economic” eect of the policy, we could look at the eect on
turnover:
∂ ln(y)
∂CCL
= −δ exp(δCCL)E(u∗). (4.4)
Unfortunately we can’t estimate u∗, because of convolution problems associated with esti-
mating two parameters for a single variable. We can however scale down the scaling function
so that the product of the rst two terms of (4.4) describe the eect of the CCL on turnover.
en the eect of CCL is around 27% increase in output for Food manufacturing (SIC 15) and
the Basic metal industry (SIC 27), 11% increase for the Fabricated metal industry (SIC 28),
and 15% increase in the Machinery and equipment (SIC 29). ese are large eects, but they
corresponds well with other, recent research on the eect of environmental policy. Both
Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre (2018) and Pavan et al. (2018) examine the eect of EU ETS on
manufacturing rms and nd an eect of similar magnitude on the TFP, though the exact
channels through which the improvements happen are unclear.
Table 4.3: Eects of CCL on ineciency for rms (CCA=0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SIC 15 SIC 27 SIC 28 SIC 29
Ineciency
CCL -1.984*** -2.014*** -3.523*** -3.009***
(-5.21) (-5.01) (-10.68) (-10.20)
Prod. func. [ln(Turnover)]
ln(Capital) 0.579*** 0.429*** 0.409*** 0.320***
(10.19) (7.46) (9.44) (9.72)
ln(Employment) 0.243*** 0.145** 0.638*** 0.670***
(4.42) (2.43) (10.04) (12.15)
ln(Energy) 0.136*** 0.154*** -0.00112 0.0322
(3.67) (4.09) (-0.04) (1.38)
ĈCA 1.913** 9.053*** -0.924 155.9***
(2.03) (8.07) (-0.23) (5.23)
R2 0.823 0.838 0.737 0.883
N 364 271 387 546
Time eects Y Y Y Y
z statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
e coecients of the inputs show that (unsurprisingly) the sectors have large dierences in
their technology, but despite these dierences they’re almost uniformly have approximately
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constant returns to scale. e coecient of ĈCA is signicant in three out of four sectors
which implies that the switching decision to the Climate Change Agreements entailed a
strategic consideration and switching is endogenous. e large dierences of the coecients
of ĈCA across sectors is interesting, but it only carries information with respect to the same
coecient in aCCA = 1 estimation. e homogenous eect of joining a CCA is described by:
βĈCA,CCA=1 − βĈCA,CCA=0. Table 4.7 reports the estimations for the four sectors without any
correction for endogeneity of the CCA decision. As we can see CCL has a negative sign as in
the baseline estimations (Table 4.3), but it’s insignicant in all sectors. Ignoring endogenous
switching seems to make the estimates less precise and biases (aenuates) the eect of the
CCL.
Tables 4.4 show the eect over time with post-policy year dummies interacted with the CCL
dummy. e estimations all support that policy has a larger eect over time, which is in line
with Porter’s theory, that over time rm have time to adapt. is aer-eect is largest in the
Machinery and equipment industry (SIC 29) where the coecient is -2.8 at the induction of
policy until -3 in 2004, which implies about 7% of the eect happens in the years aer the
policy. For Basic metals (SIC 27) and Fabricated metals (SIC 28) the it is somewhat smaller
with 4% and 5% of the eect appearing in later years, respectively. In Food manufacturing
(SIC 15) the eect in 2004 is virtually the same as in 2001. ese estimations also show that
the eect of environmental policy on ineciency is persistent.
We look at the heterogeneity of responses across rms by estimating the eect on split
sample by energy intensity at the median. Table 4.5 shows the results of the estimations.
e coecients are larger for the below median energy intensity rms and smaller for the
above median rms, but this translates to a lower marginal eect, because the second term
of (4.4) increases more quickly than the rst term does. In the Food industry (SIC 15) the
below median rms have a very small average eect of 0.003%, compared to their above
median counterparts which experience an 10% improvement. In the Basic metal industry
(SIC 27) the divide between the below and above median energy intensity rms is also large
with an eect of 4% on the below median rms and 22% on the above median rms. In the
Fabricated metal industry the dierence is less prounounced with 2% and 6% improvement
for below and above median rms, respectively. is supports the ”low hanging fruits”
interpretation of our results: energy-intensive rms can improve by adopting the existing
practices and technologies, if a policy motivates them to do so. Interestingly we nd in the
Machinery industry (SIC 29) the eect is larger in rms with smaller energy intensity: 10%
for the below median rms and 5% for the above median rms. is means that the CCL
has a larger negative eect on the ineciency of rms which were already near the frontier.
A possible way to explain this is that rms with less energy intensity adapt to the policy
quicker. Ecient rms are more likely to take part in international trade, hence they have
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Table 4.4: Eects of CCL over time on ineciency for rms (CCA= 0).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SIC 15 SIC 27 SIC 28 SIC 29
Ineciency
CCL×(Year=2001) -1.779*** -1.973*** -3.396*** -2.840***
(-5.53) (-5.96) (-10.95) (-9.62)
CCL×(Year=2002) -1.984*** -2.014*** -3.523*** -2.845***
(-5.18) (-6.03) (-11.31) (-10.06)
CCL×(Year=2003) -1.791*** -2.008*** -3.465*** -2.929***
(-5.66) (-6.06) (-11.17) (-10.34)
CCL×(Year=2004) -1.777*** -2.061*** -3.576*** -3.009***
(-5.40) (-6.15) (-11.63) (-10.69)
Prod. func. [ln(Turnover)]
ln(Capital) 0.579*** 0.429*** 0.409*** 0.320***
(10.35) (7.46) (9.49) (9.32)
ln(Employment) 0.243*** 0.145** 0.638*** 0.670***
(4.50) (2.28) (9.92) (11.96)
ln(Energy) 0.136*** 0.154*** -0.00112 0.0322
(3.76) (4.04) (-0.04) (1.27)
ĈCA 1.913** 9.053*** -0.924 155.9***
(2.00) (8.01) (-0.25) (4.97)
R2 0.823 0.838 0.737 0.883
N 364 271 387 546
Time eects Y Y Y Y
z statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
97
Environmental Policy and Biased Innovation
Table 4.5: Eects of CCL on ineciency for rms with dierent energy intensity (CCA= 0)
SIC 15 SIC 27 SIC 28 SIC 29
Below
median
Above
median
Below
median
Above
median
Below
median
Above
median
Below
median
Above
median
Ineciency
CCL -10.26*** -3.556*** -4.786*** -2.359*** -5.871*** -4.214*** -3.458*** -4.487***
(-9.00) (-8.65) (-12.41) (-5.72) (-9.99) (-11.51) (-8.13) (-13.36)
Prod. func. [ln(Turnover)]
ln(Capital) 0.231*** 0.540*** 0.110** 0.314*** 0.377*** 0.321*** 0.360*** 0.195***
(3.63) (10.58) (2.24) (5.37) (3.50) (6.66) (8.77) (3.44)
ln(Employment) 0.206*** 0.136*** -0.0324 0.136** 0.153 0.572*** 0.552*** 0.558***
(3.39) (3.07) (-0.48) (2.33) (0.81) (8.31) (8.19) (6.25)
ln(Energy) 0.145*** 0.0487* 0.340*** 0.223*** 0.110*** 0.0669* 0.110*** 0.0669*
(3.40) (1.90) (14.11) (5.33) (3.17) (1.72) (3.17) (1.72)
ˆCCA -18.90*** 3.040*** 5.429*** 4.955*** 15.47*** -0.672 -11.54*** 14.46***
(-7.19) (3.92) (9.27) (6.28) (2.58) (-0.15) (-4.13) (4.72)
R2 0.867 0.749 0.893 0.903 0.709 0.714 0.870 0.752
N 301 259 100 171 96 291 293 253
Time eects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
z statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
a more direct access to R&D and new technologies (Bernard et al., 2003). ey also have
access to global supply chains, so it’s easier to substitute their (polluting) inputs. Albrizio
et al. (2017b) nd similar results: in their estimation environmental policy improves the
performance of the top rms, but slows the growth of the laggard rms.
To test the robustness of our results we conduct several robustness checks. First, we relax the
assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function and generalise it to a translog production
function. ough the main coecient becomes insignicant, the direction is the same
(negative) and statistically indistinguishable from our baseline results. Table 4.8 looks at
what happens if instead of controlling for time eects (assuming that demand shocks are
same within the 2-digit SIC code), we include 4-digit sector specic time eects. is implies
that the demand shocks are more specic to sectors, for example in Food manufacturing
(SIC 15), there’s dierent demand shocks to the production of poultry meat (SIC 1511)
and the manufacturing of margarine (SIC 1543). e results are robust to the inclusion of
sector-specic time eects.
Finally, Table 4.9 reports the robustness of results to outliers. We exclude all the observations
above the 99th and below the 1st percentile. e results change a bit, in Basic metals (SIC
27) and Fabricated metals (SIC 28) the point estimates are larger (in absolute value). In the
Machinery (SIC 29) it’s slightly lower, but these dierences are insignicant when compared
to the baseline estimates.
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4.6 Conclusion
While there’s a growing concern about the need for climate regulations, oen the competitive-
ness concerns are highlighted in the political area as the main constraints of implementing
stringent policies. e present study investigated the empirical relevance of these concerns.
It found that environmental regulations actually improve competitiveness. e results sup-
port Michael Porter’s hypothesis about the positive eect of environmental regulations on
competitiveness. In the present, stochastic frontier, framework it was found that stringent
environmental policy enhances eciency. Specically the Climate Change Levy in the
United Kingdom increased output (given the inputs) of Food manufacturing and Basic metal
manufacturing rms by approximately 27%, Fabricated metals by 11%, Machinery by 15%.
ese estimations strongly support the PH across sectors. e dynamic estimation provides
a further support: in the long run the eciency gains increase, as rms have more time to
adapt. It’s important to note that the results are robust to a variety of robustness checks and
seing.
ere could be several mechanisms at work here. A stochastic frontier seing naturally lends
itself to the interpretation of low hanging fruits; managers systematically make suboptimal
decisions, environmental policies could ’nudge’ them towards the optimum. is ’nudge’
could happen by simply reducing information asymmetries about best practices or highlight-
ing input (energy) ineciencies by increasing the marginal price of the input. e other
mechanisms (e.g. new technologies, investment) of PH are unlikely to manifest immediately
aer the policy, though there’s an indication that these mechanisms might also be at work,
as the eect increases over time.
e ndings of this study show that while climate change regulation do oen impose costs
on the economy, if well-designed they could help rms to be ecient. e Climate Change
Levy package seemed to improve the eciency in Food manufacturing, Machinery and
equipment, Basic metal and Fabricated metal industries.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Table 4.6: Results of the rst stage probit estimation of the selection model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SIC 15 SIC 27 SIC 28 SIC 29
CCA
CO2 intensity 0.00264** 0.00113 0.0700*** 0.0300
(2.44) (0.15) (3.48) (0.15)
Energy intensity -5687.9* -37306.4* -3932.4 -63258.2
(-1.89) (-1.92) (-0.35) (-0.49)
Constant -0.937*** -0.897*** -2.278*** -2.456***
(-14.59) (-9.50) (-14.85) (-10.98)
N 572 424 613 732
Time eects Y Y Y Y
z statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Eects of CCL on ineciency for rms, without sample selection correction.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SIC 15 SIC 27 SIC 28 SIC 29
Ineciency
CCL -0.129 -0.0155 -0.144 -0.363
(-1.51) (-0.11) (-0.68) (-0.93)
Prod. func. [ln(Turnover)]
ln(Capital) 0.583*** 0.597*** 0.413*** 0.358***
(12.55) (9.81) (9.77) (10.26)
ln(Energy) 0.139*** 0.165*** -0.00232 0.0276
(4.51) (3.74) (-0.08) (1.15)
ln(Employment) 0.272*** 0.128* 0.649*** 0.798***
(5.81) (1.95) (10.35) (16.41)
R2 0.812 0.763 0.743 0.861
N 439 326 396 550
Time eects Y Y Y Y
z statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.8: Sectoral time eects (CCA= 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SIC 15 SIC 27 SIC 28 SIC 29
Ineciency
CCL -1.984*** -2.014*** -3.651*** -3.009***
(-5.02) (-5.09) (-10.81) (-10.19)
Prod. func. [ln(Turnover)]
ln(Capital) 0.579*** 0.429*** 0.409*** 0.320***
(10.47) (7.70) (9.64) (9.41)
ln(Employment) 0.243*** 0.145** 0.638*** 0.670***
(4.41) (2.48) (10.18) (11.98)
ln(Energy) 0.136*** 0.154*** -0.00112 0.0322
(3.63) (4.07) (-0.04) (1.37)
ĈCA 1.913** 9.053*** -0.924 155.9***
(2.01) (8.26) (-0.21) (5.17)
R2 0.823 0.838 0.737 0.883
N 364 271 387 546
Sector-specic time eects Y Y Y Y
z statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.9: 1% extreme values dropped (CCA= 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SIC 15 SIC 27 SIC 28 SIC 29
Ineciency
CCL -1.984*** -2.567*** -3.790*** -2.981***
(-4.97) (-5.88) (-11.44) (-9.55)
Prod. func. [ln(Turnover)]
ln(Capital) 0.579*** 0.429*** 0.404*** 0.324***
(10.43) (7.34) (9.57) (9.79)
ln(Employment) 0.243*** 0.144** 0.583*** 0.707***
(4.39) (2.41) (9.25) (14.19)
ln(Energy) 0.136*** 0.154*** 0.0121 0.0298
(3.64) (3.85) (0.39) (1.28)
ĈCA 1.913** 9.058*** -1.083 126.8***
(2.01) (7.99) (-0.27) (5.43)
R2 0.823 0.820 0.723 0.887
N 364 267 378 540
Time eects Y Y Y Y
z statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.10: Eects of CCL intensity on ineciency for rms when the production function is
Translog (CCA=0)
SIC 15 SIC 27 SIC 28 SIC 29
Ineciency
CCL -1.914 -3.386* -8.366 -11.75
(-0.89) (-1.69) (-0.00) (-0.00)
Prod. func. [ln(Turnover)]
ln(Capital) 2.377*** 0.566 -0.00823 -1.036**
(5.77) (1.00) (-0.02) (-2.19)
ln(Employment) -0.801* 1.443** 1.758*** 1.975***
(-1.72) (2.02) (2.69) (2.74)
ln(Energy) -0.564 -0.494 -0.845* -0.786*
(-1.53) (-1.45) (-1.71) (-1.84)
ln(Capital)2 -0.0476 0.0826*** 0.0249 0.0847*
(-1.25) (2.86) (0.66) (1.89)
ln(Energy)2 0.0418 0.0827*** 0.0217 0.0293
(2.22) (5.14) (0.74) (1.58)
ln(Employment)2 0.082** -0.112 0.0434 0.0631
(2.06) (-1.53) (0.49) (0.72)
ln(Capital)×ln(Employment) 0.0406 0.185*** -0.107 -0.126
(0.67) (3.12) (-1.23) (-1.15)
ln(Capital)×ln(Energy) -0.0593 -0.160*** 0.0375 0.0261
(-1.11) (-3.14) (0.64) (0.64)
ln(Energy)×ln(Employment) -0.0241 -0.112* -0.0399 -0.0548
(0.53) (-1.84) (-0.56) (-0.94)
ĈCA 0.564 8.227*** -1.006 171.6***
(0.53) (7.45) (-0.23) (5.40)
R2 0.855 0.859 0.756 0.891
N 364 271 387 546
Time eects Y Y Y Y
z statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Environmental problems pose a major challenge for governments around the world. While
the population demands more and more environmental protection, the perceived or real
tensions between the stringency of environmental policies on one hand, and productivity
and eciency on the other hand make governments cautious when implementing these
policies.
In this dissertation I aimed to tackle crucial questions such as: Do environmental policies
induce innovation? Can they be used to change the direction of innovative activity? Do
these innovations result into eciency and productivity gains?
To capture innovation and competitiveness more fully, I used the methods of productivity
and eciency analysis. ese methods enabled me to capture a wider variety of eects: not
only technological innovation, but also innovation in management and corporate practices.
Instead of proxying innovation by patent counts or R&D expenditures, I simply assumed
that any change in productive activities may be viewed as an innovation (technological or
otherwise). Similarly, I remained agnostic about the nature of competition and the relation
between investment and productivity. Indeed, this dissertation could be viewed as an agnostic
estimation of the impact of environmental policies on innovation and competitiveness.
I have largely cast my work within Michael Porter’s (1991) framework, which is helpful in
contextualizing many of these questions and in shaping possible policy responses: the in-
creased biasedness of innovation as a reaction for environmental regulation may be explained
by the ’weak’ form of the Porter Hypothesis, whereas the possible channels through which
innovation increases competitiveness may be described by the ’strong’ Porter Hypothesis.
For example, Porter and Van der Linde (1995) give the example of rms which participated
voluntarily in the Environmental Protection Agency’s ’Green Lights’ program and within 2
years their initial investments more than paid o.
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e rst essay examined how energy prices are correlated with environmental and economic
innovation, and found signicant and robust associations with energy price expectations.
With data envelopment analysis in this chapter, I was able to disentangle the eciency and
technical change. Overall, Hick’s induced innovation hypothesis seems to hold: energy price
expectations are in fact associated with environmentally biased technological change in the
US metal industry. Future prices are beer predictors than current prices, which conforms
to economic intuition. It’s not worth investing innovative activities if the prices increase
only temporarily and won’t hold in the future. is supports the results of the previous
literature that energy prices induce energy specic innovations with a few qualications: (1)
the induced innovation hypothesis is true for inventions (i.e. for technical change), (2) that
energy price expectations drive innovation rather than current energy prices and (3) not
all energy prices have the same eect. Environmental innovation is found to be driven by
natural gas and coal price expectations, but hindered by electricity price expectations.
e second essay investigated the other side of the question: do these induced, environmen-
tal innovations result into eciency and productivity gains? Unlike the prior, rm-level
literature the second essay looked at the outcomes at the (U.S.) state level. By using stochastic
frontier analysis it used a tool ing Porter’s framework of inecient rms. In eect, the
chapter estimated a production function and examined deviation from it as eciency short-
falls. e focus of the chapter was the relationship between the shortfalls and environmental
policy. Using the stochastic framework the chapter looked at the eect of environmental
policy on ineciency, thereby testing the Porter hypothesis. To estimate the causal impact
on ineciency it used instrumental variable approach, taking advantage of the exogenous
variation of thunderstorms and wind speed. e results showed that the Porter hypothesis is
true; environmental regulation modestly, but signicantly increases eciency and reverse
causality was found to aenuate the Porter eect. Inecient sectors increase pollution,
which increases the demand for a stringent environmental policy, so it’s more dicult
to observe the negative relationship between environmental policy and ineciency. e
chapter contradicts the early literature of Porter hypothesis, which used abatement costs as
stringency proxies, and generally found that the PH didn’t hold up to empirical scrutiny. It
contributes to the newly emerging literature using dierent stringency proxies, which tend
to nd that PH is true, at least in some cases.
e third essay continued to investigate this topic, but looking at more sectors (at a more
granular level) and basing the estimation on plant-level outcomes. e PH was tested by
exploiting the variation introduced by the Climate Change Levy across UK plants. In this
essay, I found that stringent environmental policy reduced ineciency in all the four sectors
examined (Food and beverages, Basic metal, Fabricated metal, and Machinery). e actual
eect on turnover is between 11% and 27%. A large, signicant eect.
e chapters do point to a few conclusions. First, ineciencies seem to be large enough to be
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measurable (as dened by stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis). is
implies that policy-makers and the literature should take Porter and van der Linde’s (1995)
claim seriously: “[i]n many cases emissions are a sign of ineciency” (p. 105); and indeed
“[t]he world doesn’t t the Panglossian belief that rms always make optimal choices” (p.
99).
e second overarching conclusion is that environmental policies do aect the economic
activity of rms. e policies’ eect is not always (or even most of the time) negative,
however. In the dissertation, both the sectoral and rm-level estimations showed eciency
improvement as a result of environmental policy. is implies that, (at least) under certain
conditions, the Porter hypothesis is true: exible regulations enhance eciency. ough the
data limitations didn’t enable a detailed investigation of the exact mechanisms involved, the
stochastic frontier seing points mostly towards technology adoption, improving resource
ineciencies and possibly raising corporate awareness.
By using productivity analysis in the dissertation, I was able to capture a broader range of
innovations. Innovation is oen thought of in terms of a technological advancement in a
product or a process. However the process of innovation must be seen as a much wider
concept: productivity analysis captures any change in productive activity, be it from a more
competent manager or a new soware for the assembly line.
e variety of proxies for the stringency of environmental policies in the dissertation also
showed that the results are likely to be independent of the specic variables. In the rst
essay, I proxied environmental policy stringency with energy prices, which can captures
environmental policies, even though it also captures other factors (e.g. demand or supply
shocks). In the second essay, I used an index number, which is more comprehensive and
it only measures what it’s intended to measure. Finally, in the third essay I evaluated a
specic policy (the Climate Change Levy) in the United Kingdom. Evaluating a specic
environmental policy improves the identication, hence the accuracy of the estimations and
these estimations also conrmed the Porter hypothesis. Still the dissertation has limitations.
All the essays examined the manufacturing sector, because manufacturing has clearly dened
boundaries, inputs and outputs. However the share of manufacturing in total economic
activity is declining; the service sector takes an ever larger slice in total economic activity.
e conclusions found in the present dissertation may not be applicable in an economy
where the majority of environmental regulations address the service sector.
e conclusions of the dissertation have bearing on current debates about environmental
policies. It seems that the worries for costs of environmental policy in terms of competitive-
ness may be overstated. With badly designed policies, certain industries or under certain time
horizon they might have empirical relevance, but the productive eciency improving eects
seem to be robust. is implies that there needn’t be a trade-o between environmental
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protection and competitiveness. Or as Catherine Mann, the former chief economist of the
OECD, put it: “what is good for the environment, can be good for growth, too” (Mann, 2017).
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